Strategic Wargaming and the Israeli Political-Military Dialogue

Dado Center Journal for Contemporary Issues in Operational Art | IDF Operations Directorate

Issue 13: War-Games, October 2017

The IDF General Staff’s wargaming methodology, based on the experience of recent years, accelerates systemic learning by the senior Command, and facilitates concept development and strategic operational planning in the IDF and wider Israeli defense community.[2]

The main characteristics of this approach to wargaming include the integrative use of scenario-based interactions, iterative and dynamic role-playing, and facilitated constructed discussions. Each case is unique, and every game requires a bespoke design. Yet one of the principles that has been followed throughout is the broadening participation from the IDF’s most senior commanders, the wider Israeli defense community and other branches of government. However, these war-games have, with extremely rare exceptions, been left as an exclusive territory of defense professionals, without any parallel active participation of elected officials and political decision-makers. As a result, civilian decision-making during these games is represented by a “fictitious” political echelon. This is usually done by a former senior official who, by virtue of his unique experience and knowledge, takes upon himself the challenge of stepping for a few hours into the shoes of the prime minister, the defense minister and the cabinet all together. This has the potential to impair the intellectual inquiry into the interactions and tensions between political and military decision-making that occurs through the game.

This article outlines the need for developing a joint war-game including both senior military commanders and senior elected officials. That is, a war-game where the prime minister and at least some of the senior cabinet members, together with the IDF chief of staff and at least some of the ranking officers, are playing. This paper is therefore concerned with the application of wargaming as a means of developing an advanced strategic dialogue between professional military officers and elected politicians.

The article will argue that such war-games are beneficial because they may form a space for joint learning, particularly in the contemporary era of constant change and increased uncertainty. Therefore, the article deals first with the cognitive challenge of handling multiple and rapid changes that characterize contemporary problems. These chiefly include the convergence of geostrategic developments and the changes in the character of warfare which, together, amplify the complexity of security challenges.

The nature of the cognitive challenge is the basis of the argument about the need for such a space for joint learning by political and military leaders. The article will emphasize that these two groups have an inseparable shared responsibility. This is what necessitates the effort to clarify and resolve military-political tensions, which arise through the different professional lenses of national security practitioners.

A further argument will be presented regarding the unique contribution of wargaming to improving political-military dialogue. This part of the article will focus on the advantages attributed to the integrated wargaming methodology devised for the IDF, which supplements traditional formats of high-level political-military deliberation. An emphasis will be placed on the contribution of the game to improving decision-makers’ judgment.

Lastly, the article will discuss the difficulties of engaging with elected officials in this type of interaction, addressing possible political reservations. The article will then suggest expanding the range of options for involvement of elected civilian decision-makers in war-games, and defining the game as a framework for an intimate, non-binding, dialogue. Further ideas on the issue will be presented towards the end of the article as an invitation for further discussion.

Part A: ‘No longer black pawn strikes a white foe’

Geostrategic changes, along with the changing character of warfare, amplify the level of complexity associated with political and security challenges. The military and political leadership are left with a more intense cognitive challenge in their decision-making. The paper would later discuss how wargaming may help responding to this problem, but first we should address change and the associated cognitive challenge.

On Change

One reason behind the sense of growing complexity is the accumulation and convergence of processes and developments, both near and far. For example, US policy under President Trump – which departs from the traditional line held by consecutive US presidents of both parties – underlies the changes in America’s role as custodian of world order and of international stability.[3]

The accumulated impact of the changes in the US, along with the changes experienced across Europe, is so significant (ideological polarization and nationalist resurgence against the backdrop of a prolonged financial crisis, waves of Middle-Eastern refugees and Britain’s decision to leave the European Union)[4] that some regard it as destabilizing the very foundations of the post-WWII world order.[5] North-Korea’s provocative ballistic tests[6] and President Trump’s threat ‘to totally destroy North Korea’ [7]— could be seen as evidence of weakening international security, not of a stable world order.

The effect of changes in US policy is thrown into sharper relief when contrasted with the proactive approach taken by Russia in its return to the Middle East – part of its continued effort to regain its international status.[8]

Additional processes should also be mentioned, such as the fallout from the Arab Spring including the collapse of several Arab regimes; waves of refugees and their impact on the regional economy and demography;[9] the rising significance of non-state and proxy actors, along with the internal struggle between Sunni and Shia in the Islamic world;[10] Iran’s continuous subversion and quest for regional hegemony and its operational activity ever closer to Israeli borders;[11] as well as global Jihad’s continuous evolution with implications for internal security, crime and social affairs in Western societies.[12] All these processes occur against a backdrop of technological progress, with sweeping social, cultural, ethical and security implications. What has already been termed “the fourth industrial revolution” (Industry 4.0) includes much more than the “mere” connectivity between humans in different parts of the globe through social media, but also network connections between humans and devices, and between devices themselves (the Internet of Things).[13] Such developments bring about new questions on the possible war-time role of cyberspace, as well as the relationship between cyberwarfare and deterrence.[14] These are but a few examples of the processes which characterize the present era of change.

From an Israeli perspective, all these changes have been felt significantly during military campaigns against a variety of threats and adversaries. The changes have converged to present the military and civilian leadership with challenges in every field, that complicate understanding, analysis and decision-making. Broadly described, such challenges include, simultaneously, intense and frequent decisions on the use of military force in parallel to diplomatic negotiations, managing crises that might potentially escalate to war, dealing with enemy WMD stockpiles and managing Israeli deterrence.[15]

While some of the problems are manifested operationally in Israel’s immediate geographic environment, they may originate far from Israel’s borders. Similarly, the tension between Russia and NATO countries on Crimea, has linkages to the Russian involvement in the Syrian fighting;[16] or the mutual linkages between North-Korean nuclear tests and the future of the Iran nuclear deal.[17]

The changes are also important militarily, most strikingly in the centrality and rising significance of the threat posed to civilian population and national economy (“the Homefront”). This was seen especially during the four recent Israeli campaigns – the “Second Lebanon War” (2006) “Operation Cast Lead” (2009) “Operation Pillar of Defense” (2012) and “Operation Protective Edge” (2014). The changes have brought about the equally significant recognition of the fragility of traditional definitions of adversaries and typology of conflicts, given the character of warfare practiced and adversaries' modus operandi as discussed briefly below.

Sharp, distinct definitions are pointless for describing the actions of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, there is a need, instead, to look at the “blurred” and in-between areas. The reason this different view is required, is the diversified modus operandi employed by these organizations: various terrorist tactics, verity of stand-off fire power against civilian population,[18] sub-terrain warfare and commando operations,[19] formation of semi-military structures. Yoram Schweitzer suggests referring to such constructs as ‘armies of “terrorilla,” which combine terrorist and guerrilla modes of warfare, operate within a civilian population, and using this population to shield themselves.’[20]

In addition to breakouts of hostilities in high-intensity conflicts (although limited in scale compared to major wars of the past), the IDF has been pursuing, for the most part covertly, complex operations, through a variety of channels, under the rubric of the “Campaign Between Wars”. Initiated against a background of regional change, it has brought about significant conceptual and operational changes in the IDF.[21] Under this framework of the ‘Campaign Between Wars’, Israel continuously directs its operations to finely balance its desire to avert the threat of war, with its desire to secure optimal conditions for an Israeli victory in a future war, should it break out.[22]

‘Campaign-Between-Wars’ related activity also involves a significant cognitive challenge of occasionally being required to abandon fundamental assumptions and operational patterns that have stood for decades at the very heart of the nation’s defense activity. This necessitates development of a constant critical approach to our own assumptions, due to a rapidly changing environment. Critical thinking and constant re-interpretation of reality are essential to our ability to develop a deeper understanding of the opportunities, constraints and risks (some tactical, but mostly strategic) which stem from the complex of conflicting interests in Israel’s vicinity. A good example can be found it in the colorful description given by Major General Herzi Halevy, Director of Israel Defense Intelligence (DIDI) speaking at the Herzliya Conference:

“The game-board has changed. Unlike in Hanoch Levin’s poem ‘Black pawn strikes a white foe’, we’re no longer in a two-color war. It's not just good guys and bad guys. And the players on the board are changing their identity. This multi-colored chessboard is only a modest description of what is going on today in the Middle East. In our experience, there's a complex of interests which needs to be described.” [23]

MG Halevy openly discussed a dilemma not easily admitted in public: how to handle enemies, with whom an unexpected confluence of interest has been created by regional dynamics: “Sometimes we find a situation in which a bitter enemy of ours is about to get hit, and I instinctively want to pick up the phone and warn him, because given the set-up of the pawns on the board, it's not good for us that this bad thing might happen to our enemy,” Halevy says.

Taken together, the above references allude to profound change in the methods of warfare and modus operandi of both the IDF and its enemies, in traditional operational frameworks, and, not least, of how we define friends and foes.

The Cognitive Challenge

The many fundamental changes discussed above raise questions about how the world should be seen and understood, and how this can be translated into policy and a way of designing and using force. Scholars and practitioners have debated these issues in recent years, attempting to develop a conceptual framework to deal with the economic and geopolitical changes and the apparent rise of uncertainty.[24]

This debate has found expression in precisely the same metaphor that Maj. Gen. Halevy used in his reference to multi-colored pawns on a chessboard. Others variously make use of the same metaphor, or call to abandon it. For example, Joseph Nye describes the world as a ‘complex three-dimensional chess game.’[25] The top chessboard is the one of military power, where the United States retains is position as the world’s superpower. The middle chessboard, according to Nye, is of multi-polar economic competition between the world’s major economies. The bottom chessboard is of transnational relations that create changes uncontrolled by governments: unlimited interpersonal interactions, non-state actors, banks, corporations, terrorist smuggling weapons, hackers threatening cybersecurity and other problems that are not confined by physical borders, such as pandemics and climate change.[26]

Unlike Nye, who places chessboards one on top of the other, Anne Marie Slaughter offers a different approach. She argues for a profound conceptual change, and underlines the need to examine the world as a web, not as a chessboard: 

‘To see the international system as a web is to see a world not of states but of networks […] In this world, problems and threats arise because people are too connected, not connected enough, or connected in the wrong ways to the wrong people or things.’[27]

Slaughter emphasizes the need to examine connections between phenomena and not the borders which divide them clearly contradicts Nye’s chessboard metaphor.

The value of such a conceptualization is not just theoretical, it has value for the most practical contexts too. This is especially so given the blurring of traditional distinctions between phenomena and characteristics of warfare and operations. For example, between “military front” and “Homefront”; and that because of the ever-tighter linkage between the political and military spheres, the connections and linkages between them must be deeply analyzed.[28] The entirety, “the whole”, is the difficult thing to grasp and understand, and it is what requires a greater cognitive effort.

Dealing with complex problems and change is not new in itself, and it’s certainly not unique to Israel. Rather, in every generation civilian leaders and military commanders alike are required to face anew the changes of their time, to reinterpret reality and develop relevant, up-to-date concepts and responses. Rising to this challenge is far from an intuitive or easy task.  Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Professor Yehoshafat Harcabi had previously noted this difficulty:

‘For many Israelis, it is difficult, intellectually, ideologically, and perhaps also emotionally, to elevate themselves to comprehensive strategic thinking concerning the factors that influence Israel’s security […] The design of security policy is faced by the difficulty to incorporate a large number of factors surrounded by uncertainty. Decision-makers are therefore seeking refuge in assumptions that are nothing but methodical ones.’[29]

Harcabi distils the cognitive challenge: how to grasp the multiplicity of elements and uncertainty; and how to overcome one’s hidden assumptions and emotional, cognitive and even ideological biases when strategizing? One possible obstacle is the limitations of human working memory. That is, the ability to remember at the same time a large number of details and arguments and examining them comprehensively.[30] However, even if the capacity of human memory could be increased, something else would have been required that is not only concerned with human data processing.

When challenges of the present era seem too unique and complicated to understand, it may be instrumental to recall two concepts already offered a few decades ago to describe complex problems. Although they were brought to the fore in contexts other than defense, they may still serve the issues discussed here as well.

The first concept has been coined as “World Problematique”, or “Problematique”, for short.[31] The second concept is “Wicked Problems”[32]. While an in-depth analysis of the two goes beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to indicate the essence of their combined meaning and the lesson they offer in the context of this work. That is, when discussing complex problems, resorting to the banal and overused assertion that “one must look at the whole picture” is simply not enough. Instead, one needs to examine how problems “behave.”

The concept “Problematique” refers broadly to how the convergence of different problems and phenomena results in new problems. Such an approach cannot be confined to merely admiring the complex challenge we are faced with and lamenting “it’s complicated”. Instead, it demands a proactive approach, looking at several fields and different subjects in parallel, and deciphering their aggregate meaning.

To this “Wicked Problems” offers an essential supplementary approach. It highlights the principle of interaction between components of such complex and “wicked” problems, the difficulty to forecast their behavior as well as the lack of a pre-determined solution.

These two concepts do not just emphasize the high number of elements to consider, nor merely the convergence of many problems into a new one, but rather the interaction between components and problems. [33] That is, when we try to understand complex problems, it is insufficient to just point out the existence of many elements and linkages. What must be understood is the nature of the relationships between the problems, the essence of their interaction and how these come about. What movement does it generate, and, consequently, what is the new dynamic which evolves as a result of these interactions? These are the aspects that create “the whole.”

Should this type of “Systems Approach” be accepted, the limits of the traditional ubiquitous way of political-military discussions will quickly be perceived, especially so whenever a complex task must be clarified and solved. It seems impossible to fully grasp problems, let alone the convergence of problems and the creation of new ones, nor even to understand our place in the dynamic and complicated systemic problems, simply by using the familiar methods of situation assessments, and the reports that appear in the "recent developments” briefing.

The periodic high-level and multi-participant situation briefings can, up to a certain point, serve their useful purpose. Such meetings, along with the discussions held to sanction operations, have become institutions themselves, so much so that they constitute part of the routine of the upper echelons of military commanders and civilian decision-makers, serving an essential function in the management of national security affairs. These traditions maintain a higher degree of “friction” between the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense on the one hand, and IDF chiefs and the rest of the security organizations on the other, mostly concerning the pressing issues of the day. However, the traditional characteristics of these discussions make them inherently and acutely limited in their ability to provide an in-depth view of the “Change” and the “Problematique”.

The Need for a Joint War-Game

In view of the challenges discussed above, the question then arises: what is the nature of the need for a joint war-game for the political and military levels? Commanders and statesmen are always faced with change and complex problems. But it seems that over the years the pace of change is perceived to be accelerating, challenging leadership’s ability to learn about complicated new problems, and to make decisions based on a foundation of thorough knowledge and profound systemic insight. This difficulty is amplified when dealing with urgent challenges and emergencies, given the spectrum of threats, where ‘political-military activity has become ever more hectic,’ as Professor Uzi Arad, former National Security Adviser, and Limor Ben-Har assert.[34] Dr Chuck Freilich, reflecting upon his years at the Prime Minister’s Office, offers a similar perspective: 

‘Israel faces numerous complex national security “environments”: diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. (…) Growing environmental complexity led not just to new areas of geographic and functional interest, but to far more complex decisions.’[35]

Considered together, these observations support the claim that this type of problems and cognitive challenges require joint political-military learning about both our surroundings, as well as our own system: our interest and objectives, our capabilities and limitations. If that is the case, then it becomes clearer why one needs to connect the military discussion with the political discussion, not to justify their separation.

It is impossible to ignore the differences in the operational environments of the professional military officers, and those of elected politicians. Members of echelon has their own references and viewpoints, stemming, amongst other things, from the different content-worlds that characterize each level, and from the different responsibilities assigned to the individuals serving in official positions.

The military sphere is mostly characterized by actions, operations and clear definitions. In contrast, politics is, more often than not, characterized by intentional ambiguity and opacity. This is the space where the political-military dialogue happens. Occasionally, it amplifies the pressures and tensions under which the elected politicians and the appointed civil servants serving in these senior roles operate. These are understandable phenomena derived from human nature and characteristics of our parliamentary democracy, and also from the subordination of the IDF to the civil authority, as stipulated in Basic Law: The Military (1976): ‘The Army is subject to the authority of the Government.’[36] The argument in favor of connecting the political and military discussions does not dispute this principle, and there is no intention to make the general replace the statesman, nor to see the politician play the general’s role. Civilian authority over the military, and the subordination of the armed forces to the senior political decision-makers are fundamental cornerstones of democracy and must not be changed.[37] The dialogue between the senior political level and the military level has already been termed an “unequal dialogue”, that is: a profound dialogue in which each side expresses its opinion openly, even firmly should it be required. However, at the same time, both sides know full well that the authority given to the civilian leadership is ultimate and undisputed.[38]

At the top level of political-military decision-making, certainly from the senior civilian leadership’s perspective, the subjection is clear, yet boundaries are blurred. ‘At the summit true politics and strategy are one,’ Winston Churchill wrote.[39] From his unique vantagepoint, Churchill outlines his perception of the makeup of war:

‘There are many kinds of maneuvers in war, some only of which take place upon the battlefield. There are maneuvers far to the flank or rear. There are maneuvers in time, in diplomacy, in mechanics, in psychology; all of which are removed from the battlefield, but react often decisively upon it, and the object of all is to find easier ways, other than sheer slaughter, of achieving the main purpose. The distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as the point of view is raised.]

[…]

War, which knows no rigid divisions between French, Russian and British Allies, between Land, Sea and Air, between gaining victories and alliances, between supplies and fighting men, between propaganda and machinery […] is, in fact, simply the sum of all forces and pressures operative at a given period.’[40]

Churchill’s descriptions stand the test of time. They illustrate the integrative view required at the top, which takes into account the totality of areas, operations and civil and military efforts, without a clear distinction between what is military and what is diplomacy. The need for joint learning at an advanced level is illustrated by the overlap between both levels’ worlds, by the inherent tension between them, and precisely because of the unbreakable connection between political purpose and military action. In this context it has become regular to invoke Carl von Clausewitz’s famous quote: ‘Political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose’.[41]

Although written almost two hundred years ago, the aphorism reflects crucial principles that are valid today: military action as a means a political end; the subjection of the military to civilian authority; and, the central principle to any strategic thinking, the need to reflect together on the nexus of objectives, capabilities and constraints.

An additional reminder of the need for such a systematic discourse, and criticism of its absence, is found in a special report issued by The Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Select Subcommittee for Force Development and Defense Doctrine. Focusing on IDF’s Gideon multi-year plan,  the Report warns that without holding proper debate, the military capability might not correlate with the required activities needed to achieve political objectives.[42]

Clarifying the connection between political objectives and military capabilities, along with their resultant tensions, stands at the very heart of the political-military dialogue. This process is not devoid of bitter struggles, which occasionally stretch the fine line between what uniformed personnel are allowed to argue about with the elected leadership, and about what is possible or impossible to achieve by military force, and how to do so. A healthy political-military dialogue would bring to the surface any differences of approach and clarify them as part of an iterative conversation, not blur and suppress them. It is the political and military echelons’ shared responsibility that demands from them ‘to achieve harmonic, responsible relations that will help them better understand one another and improve the decision-making process.’[43] Such open and frank discussions do take place, yet lessons accumulated throughout our history indicate the need to for inter-echelon learning, during which, at the very least, ‘the two sides will learn which military moves are possible and what costs are needed to achieve various military and political objectives.’[44]

Interestingly, senior military officers were those to have highlighted the importance of this type of dialogue, especially in connection with political-military expectation management. For example, Brigadier-General (Res) Assaf Orion, former head of IDF Strategic Planning Division writes that ‘the very existence of policy discussions, important in itself, is not an essential condition of relevant operational planning, but it is irreplaceable for minimizing any mismatched expectations and misunderstandings between the political and military levels.’[45]

Brigadier-General Yaakov Banjo and Brigadier-General Giora Segal have argued that ‘the problem faced by armies today is a crisis of expectations of the political echelon,’ since it ‘appears that there is no clear correlation between the operational response and force-employment strategy offered by military commanders, and the expectations of the political leadership regarding the anticipated result of the use of military force, especially ground forces’ (my emphasis).[46]

A supplemental perceptive, from the point of view of the decision-making level, is offered by the former acting National Security Adviser, and previously Deputy National Security Adviser, Brigadier-General (Res) Jacob Nagel.

‘The military and its leadership genuinely argue that they would very much like the involvement of the political level and to receive precise guidelines, to guide action and to exercise, be in the daily activity or during war-games. The problem is that in practice they indeed want guidance, provided it’s the guidance they want. That is, to meet their recommendations or concepts. Even if they won’t admit it, that is the situation.’[47]

The above examples illustrate how crucial expectation management is for both echelons, being a fundamental part of their shared responsibility.

The importance of expectations management stems not from the procedural or legal interpretation of the authority trusted with each echelon. It lies instead deep in the classical foundations of defense and politics: the use of national power (military and other) to achieve political ends and to secure national interests.

This aspect that seems to have been missed in the general discourse that evolved in recent years around the implementation of the National Security Council Act, and especially following the release of the State Control’s special report on “Operation Protective Edge”. It is impossible to diminish the importance of some key recommendations made in the report, such as need to define the authority given to the Security Cabinet, and the recommendation concerning the need for an orderly briefing of cabinet ministers and to provide them essential training upon assuming office.[48]

However, focusing on procedural matters alone misses the essence of the dialogue that should take place between the professional military echelon, and the elected political echelon. It is impossible to define the relationship between the senior officers and members of cabinet merely by intelligence supply, operational updates and other staff papers, as if one echelon simply disseminates and the other simply reads.

Unlike the focus on procedure, the shared responsibility approached is fundamentally characterized by proactivity. For example, Lt. General (Res) Moshe (Bogie) Yaalon, former defense minister, considers each minister responsible for his own learning: ‘Each and every member of Cabinet has a personal responsibility to ‘develop his force’ in order to be fit for the job and for the responsibility with which he is entrusted […] Cabinet is not a “members club”. It demands ministers to invest the requisite time in deliberations. In the study of various materials, in meetings and in tours.’[49]

Similar comments were made by former minister Dan Meridor:

“Learning the issues demands, for example, setting a day once a week for study or visiting one of the security organizations or one of the units. It’s work. At least one hour of reading materials every day. If you start ‘chattering’ publicly – no one will speak to you. If you come to learn – you’ll find openness. It gives no political gain and requires time. And since there is no reward, there is less motivation for dealing with such things.”[50]

Uzi Arad connects learning (and its absence) to the quality of the decision-making and to possible dangers, and emphasizes the importance of exercises and war-games for elected officials.

“Occasionally cabinet members practice making decisions for the first time during real-life events. This might result in significant errors such as over- or underreacting. This is serious and dangerous. There is a need for simulations and other elements: reading, learning and general education. Briefing by a representative of the National Security Council is not enough. In some areas the ignorance is huge.”[51]

The above references demonstrate the inherent tension in the political-military relationship, the gaps of knowledge and the need for a space for shared learning and dialogue facilitated by unorthodox methodologies. A direct reference to the methods of discussions and war-games can be found in the Report by the Winograd Commission into the Second Lebanon War. The Commission specifically addresses discussion methodologies used by the highest civilian authorities while interacting with the military high command, repeatedly pointing to the need for using scenarios and ‘thought games’ to examine ideas and undesired consequences.[52] Discussing the desired dialogue between the political and military leaderships on objectives and capabilities, the Commission emphasizes the feedback element and that both groups should understand each other’s considerations, abilities and limitations. The Commission asserts that ‘The Political and Military echelons shall maintain a dynamic dialogue, and their relationship shall not be confined to a unilateral transfer of information and intelligence from one side, and the issuing of guidance by the other side.’ The Commission thus puts extra weight on a continuous dialogue between the two echelons.[53]

Part B: Why War-Games? Illustration by two examples

Thus far, we have established the need to improve the methods of discussion on political-military affairs due the convergence of changes and phenomena, due to the pace of change and its depth, and due to the need to examine challenges as networks and complex systems. We have also cited the explicit reference made by the Winograd Commission to the use of gaming methods. We shall now present the second central argument of this article as to the unique contribution of wargaming to improving the political-military dialogue.

To demonstrate the type of questions and dilemmas that require clarification as part of the political-military dialogue – for some of which wargaming can be instrumental – we will use two historical examples taken from past exercises and war-games in which the IDF's most senior generals took part. They show how necessary political input was to advance the military discourse. In contrast, they also show how military insights may contribute the political discussion, which has to factor in what may be possible to achieve under the strategic conditions of the period in questions.

The first example is “Even Gazit” (Hebrew for: “Hewn Stone”) conducted in February 1969.[54] Two years after the Six Day War, in the midst of the Cold War and during the War of Attrition, against the backdrop of tensions between the Soviet and American blocs, the Middle East had become battleground of superpower competition. Examining primary sources of the period indicates how the tensions between the Soviet-American blocs were perceived by the IDF senior leadership as having a direct impact on the Israeli military and political freedom of action. Under these strategic conditions, “Even Gazit” was conducted with the aim of examining the IDF Operational Plans in the event of a ‘limited war that develops into a general war.’

The transcripts of Even Gazit’s concluding discussion, preserved in the IDF archives, reveals the breadth of issues debated. Out of the complete transcript, three extracts are cited below to illustrate the connection between the sum of all condition and political constraints, and questions concerning freedom of action and operational planning as undertaken by IDF senior leadership at the time: Ariel Sharon, Ezer Weizman and Haim Bar-Lev. First, a quote of Ariel Sharon, then serving as Head of IDF Training Department. Sharon was wondering whether Israel can expect full freedom of action, asking “could there be a situation without military freedom of action?”[55] He expressed his concern about international involvement in the Middle East, which influenced the desired military objectives he recommended: “I think we should see a cloud of Russian interference, and a cloud of interference by the superpowers, including the UN. Therefore, we must determine such posts in each of the operations that would provide us with military or political advantage, even in the event the war is terminated after a short time.”[56] 

Ezer Weizman, then Chief of Operations, was concerned by the degree of freedom of action as well as the possibility of a prolonged war. Weizman assessed that the next war would be longer than the Six-Day War, and contemplated about the impact of Soviet forces over the length of the campaign and what might be achieved. “Should we conclude that Russia’s ability to interfere is serious, then the time might be 4-5 days […] I believe Russian physical interference is possible – and then how naughty can I get and how much time to do have?”  This “naughtiness”, in Weizman’s colourful words, is the degree of freedom of action Israel enjoyed under the political conditions of the period, the US-Soviet balance of power and their operational manifestations on the ground. “The level of naughtiness is a matter of discussion”, he said.[57]

Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev emphasised the connection between the possible military action and the political objective. “The question of whether or not we go to Cairo is not a question of whether holding would require two platoons or two brigades. Because it is first and foremost a diplomatic-political question.” Bar-Lev had placed his operational conclusions drawn from the exercise within a wider political context, emphasising that it is predominantly a political issue. He highlighted the tension between ambitious military objectives on the one hand, and limited resources on the other hand; as well as the need to secure a military achievement that could serve a political objective.[58]

A further example illuminates some of questions and dilemmas that require clarification as part of the political-military dialogue, to which a joint war-game may be of use. It is taken from a war-game conducted in the mid-1990s, following the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. The game dealt with issues and dilemmas concerning IDF activities in the Palestinian territories at the time. The transcript of the game discussions allows for an examination of the debate held between several senior participants. A brief extract out of the complete transcript illustrates the linkage between the military questions with which the participants struggled, and policy questions.

- Assistant Chief of Operations, MG Gabi Ashkenazi: “There’s a problem [holding a] military discussion without the political echelon. There is a need for talking with the political echelon. Without correlation, we’ll make mistakes. I am saying it provocatively. The two are intertwined.”

- Chief of Staff, Lt. General Amon Lipkin-Shahak: “What do you recommend to the decision-maker? What do you want to achieve at the end?”

Ashkenazi outlined his recommendations, yet Lipkin-Shahak persisted. “I don’t understand what you’ve said. There’s a situation here. Based on the situation, what does the army intend to recommend?”

- MG Ashkenazi: “What was described by the Central Command’s commander seems correct. It is difficult for the army to be disconnected from what is wanted [by the political echelon] to happen at the end. Therefore, it is impossible to disconnect.”

- Commander of Northern Command, MG Amiram Levin: “… readiness in all sectors. It must come as an order […] Seems to me there’s too much quibbling and throwing it at the political echelon’s door-step.”[59]

The above extracts illustrate the close dependency between political guidance and military planning, as they frequently surface during war-games and exercises held at the General Staff and other major Commands. The two examples cited illustrate how prevalent the linkage is between military action and political conditions and objectives, and how essential it is to clarify these linkages, especially so when it comes to campaign planning and execution.

The questions about the desired political objective and possible military achievement are also illustrated in the two examples mentioned. This is seen in “Even Gazit” where Bar-Lev regards the issue of reaching Cairo as a strategic issue, and not as a question of operational planning (“it is first and foremost a diplomatic-political question”).

The same issue is also illustrated in the second example, the General Staff’s war-game concerning the Palestinian theatre, in which MG Ashkenazi points at the difficulty of discussing the pressing challenge of the period exclusively through a military prism (“There’s a problem [holding a] military discussion without the political echelon. Without correlation, we’ll make mistakes. The two are intertwined”).

Questions concerning freedom of action are vividly exemplified in the case of “Even Gazit”. The extracts illustrate the need to understand the operational constraints derived from the geopolitical conditions, and the accumulated impact of all such constraints on the freedom of military action (“the level of naughtiness,” according to Ezer Weizman). From that follows a discussion about what may be feasible and desired militarily, yet undesired politically.

Such questions are frequently discussed among senior military commanders as well as in their interactions with their political masters. More often than not, this is done under the pressure of urgent developments and without any use of war-games. Why then does these issue need to be examined through a war-game as well? The principle reason lies in the war-game’s ability to facilitate the generation of systemic and updated insights regarding the changing reality, the emerging security problems and the possible response.

Instead of expanding the discussion on war-gaming methodologies for the strategic-operational level (a discussion developed by the author elsewhere)[60] the focus is maintained here on three main reasons that afford the game with relative advantage. First, the contribution to the exploration and examination of complex problems and their dynamics, and, as a result, improving the ability to cope with uncertainty. Second, the contribution of experiential learning to the improvement of the strategic conversation. Third, the game contribution the improvement of decision-makers’ judgment.

The paramount advantage of the strategic war-game is its contribution to the exploration and examination of complex problems dynamics, and, thereby, improving our ability to handle uncertainty. Strategic war-games, in their dynamic format (which have gained a foothold in the IDF General Staff in recent years) include the representation of multiple entities. Such games do not revolve around only the “good-guys” versus the “bad-guys” (“Blue” vs. “Red”), but instead give expression to far richer elements and phenomena. They include a thorough research and preparation phase, and they contain scenario-based role-plays concerning plausible futures, taking place in a number or “rounds” or “time moves”.[61]

The combination and integration of methodologies is particularly instrumental in generating new insights about behaviour of both rivals and allies, as well as on actions and counteractions. This enables understanding on how strategic considerations may evolve, or even change, to better understand the linkages between problems’ various factors and components, thus allowing to learn something new about the challenges that might come about as a result of the problem’s dynamic.  As a result, it is possible to identify threats and opportunities that might otherwise remain overlooked while employing other methods of discussion and analysis. Such war-games are accompanied by facilitated discussions which induce the generation of new insights and new meaning derived from the “futuristic game” back to the present. They are also accompanied by a systematic discourse analysis, which allows revealing hidden assumptions, mapping areas of uncertainty and asking new questions, thus contributing to the improvement of the shared language concerning the rival system, and not least important, concerning ourselves. All that, separately and collectively, makes the war-game a powerful tool that provides decision-makers with a decision advantage, allowing them to avoid critical mistakes.[62]

The second advantage attributed to war-games in this context is the game-experience created by playing the game, which helps to improve the strategic conversation.

The author’s approach to wargaming facilitates the conditions required for experiential learning: through the use of future scenarios, role-play and by emphasizing direct human interaction and alternative viewpoints. Accumulated experience of recent years shows that the combination of methods successfully triggers imagination and creative thinking among participants, especially when dynamic role-playing techniques are employed. In such situations, some or all of the participants are stepping into others’ shoes, considering their moves from a different perspective, occasionally even the complete opposite than what they are typically used to. Taken together, the combination of such methods creates the shared learning experience on part of all individuals participating in the war-game, which is characterized by an open and informal discourse, as participants do not just ‘talk the game’ but truly ‘play the game’.[63]

Scholarly literature and practical experience together point at the particular function of informal discourse created during the game experience as a contributing element for the participants’ learning of the problem in question, learning themselves and their decision-making environment.[64]

Therefore, a degree of intellectual openness is required, together with a willingness to hold discussions in an atmosphere that encourages all participants, junior and senior alike, to surrender themselves to the game experience and express opinions outside of the consensus without fearing possible ramifications associated with military hierarchy. A successful war-game experience thus enables the development of shared language and shared concept that includes alternative interpretations. This enhances the strategic conversation among game participants, in their organisations, and contributes also to improving cross-organisational discourse.[65]

Wargaming is also an effective device for developing decision-makers’ deep understanding and improving their judgment. Manuals and procedures alone cannot guarantee good decision-making processes, and good process cannot always guarantee good decisions. Thus, an emphasis is placed here on the importance of a crucial, yet somewhat elusive, element which wargaming helps to cultivate: human judgment. 

Decision-making is more than the cerebral calculation of an average with adjustments of data and intelligence estimates. Decision-making entails ‘judgment, political sense, leadership and determination in pursuing objectives.’[66] Judgment and reason must also rely on knowledge and understanding. The Winograd Commission, which sought to set a standard for evaluation of decision-makers performance, granted extra weight to judgment, underlining its importance: ‘Judgment and national responsibility lies at the heart of the matter for the elected decision-maker, together with professionalism, strategic view as well as the experience of the professional echelon.’[67] The Commission further cited the need to consider alternatives and handling uncertainty, the need for pluralistic thinking as well as the need to pay ‘much attention to possible undesired results (for example, through different scenarios and thought games).[68]

Since the cited elements are manifested and cultivated in strategic wargaming, there is merit in regarding it as an advantageous methodology for the development of ‘deep understanding’, which in itself may be considered as an enabler for better judgment. Without such deep understanding all that is left is mere opinion, hunch, or (God forbid) guessing and gambling.

Furthermore, given that our methodological approach to strategic wargaming places a particular emphasis on creating an alternative view point and open discourse, the very use of such games may help elected decision-makers as well as the professional echelon from falling victim to Groupthink syndrome.[69] It is achieved through the expansion of the discussion framework by incorporating into the game design the competing interests of various actors, as well as multiple viewpoints (multiple actors represented, multiple participants, multiple organizations).

Thus, almost inherently, these war-games do not seek to blur dilemmas and tensions. Instead they seek to expose and bring them to the surface, bring them into consciousness and place them at the heart of the discussion. As much as the war-game allows participants to discuss problems from multiple viewpoints, and as much as the war-game helps participants stay away from vague descriptions, missing categories and using stereotypes, so too it reduces the risk of Groupthink and other familiar cognitive biases.[70]

Part C: Handling the Political Level’s Difficulties

In the absence of such a tradition, the vision for joint war-games as a device for improving political-military dialogue might seem ambitious and unachievable. Even more so, given the difficulty of gathering most members of the Israeli Cabinet to visit even an exceptionally large-scale military exercise, as in the published case of “Or Hadagan” Corps Exercise.[71] This particular episode is yet another expression of the need, and the difficulty, of inducing members of the Cabinet’s Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs to delve into the essential knowledge which is required for them to discharge their duty. There is no escape from wondering whether under such conditions, the betterment of learning and the advancement of the political-military dialogue are even achievable. At the very least, at the professional career level, it is the senior military command’s duty to persist in recruiting, convincing and even demanding the elected political echelon to fulfil its role in the shared responsibility discussed here. At the same time, to promote the vision of joint war-games, the professionals must recognise the difficulties and possible concerns of elected politicians. On the face of it, it seems such difficulties are not particular to any specific persona, rather they form a broader and continuing phenomenon.

First, it is possible to speculate on reasons why elected officials might be reluctant to actively participate in war-games and limit themselves to supervisory capacities (similar to ministerial field visitations at military exercises). For example, possible unwillingness on behalf of an elected leader to reveal his/her intentions and plans concerning issues at the heart of national security, especially controversial ones that divide public opinion. Other reasons include apprehension of elected leaders to commit to a particular course of action in relation to a distant and unknown future; a desire to refrain from conducting “virtual decision-making” on substantial and crucial issues for “exercise” purposes only, at a time when there is no pressing need to make such decisions; and concerns about possible conflict between ideological vision and realistic constraints. Furthermore, in addition to public sensitivity associated with political and defence affairs, the source of political reservation from active participation might also be associated with the ensemble of political personas and factions that constitute the cabinet. While such matters lie beyond the legitimate scope of military professionals, they should not be ignored inasmuch as they contribute to increasing the aforementioned political reluctance. Active, honest, participation in war-games might, for example, reveal an elected leader’s intentions before his/her fellow ministers, some of which might be political rivals. Thus, revealing one’s true intentions, while potentially very useful for the success of the game, can also be politically dangerous, particularly when the political leader may prefer to maintain ambiguity and refrain from making decisions. Such concerns in themselves amplify the inherent tension between maintaining the freedom of political manoeuvre (in the broadest sense of the word) that politicians normally require on the hand, and the clear, defined guidance that is essential to professional military officers on the other hand.

These concerns mix together in the view of the elected politician, till the politician perceives the risk of participation in a game as lying in completely different fields than that of the specific defence or strategic challenge around which the game revolves. For, as in any substantial discussion on matters of defence and statesmanship, the war-game experience might destabilise (even challenge) fundamental beliefs, concepts, axioms and ideologies, thus sharpening the tension between vision, constrains and risks; between wishful-thinking and practical capability.

Second, it is possible to assume there is lack of awareness of wargaming methodology and its utility. It may be the case that the ubiquitous and associative connection of the term “War-Games” has to do with sand-tables, computer-simulations and tactical response, and less with a useful methodology for discussion at the strategic-operational levels.

Third, it is possible to assume that time allocation is another issue with negative impact. Other matters and pressing issues always compete for the time and attention of senior officials, who are the principle “clients” of war-games. This is a shared problem for both political and military leaders. Since time is one the most precious resources in the senior-level decision-making environment, a conscious decision is required on part of seniors to invest the full time required during the game’s development phase, and especially so during its execution.

Experience has shown, paradoxically, that whenever a problem is more familiar, the need to cast doubt, to ask new sharp and penetrating questions, and to match it with an appropriate methodological solution, becomes ever more essential.

Is it possible to change this situation, and how can this be done? Assuming that awareness can be raised, and time may be allocated, the focus is maintained here on the possibility of political reluctance as a possible exploitation for the absence of joint participation war-games. It seems that the dread of state inquests is insufficient to bring about the desired change in decision-making processes. At the same time, humans clearly cannot simply be instructed to “think correctly” and “think creatively” through protocols and procedures. Similarly, it is impossible to simply “eliminate” the concern of elected politicians and their reluctance to discuss complicated issues that might clash with their worldview. 

Dan Meridor emphasises that decision-makers must overcome such concerns and tensions because of their potential costs:

“Some get it. They do not want discussions and do not wish to show weakness in contrast to their image […] After all, there’s this familiar expression: ‘Allow the IDF to be victorious’. They truly think that what stands in the way are external limitations, not ability. Ability is not magic, but action with reasons, causes, costs and risks.”[72]

There is no escape from recalling that statesmanship (let alone generalship) is not only a matter of ideology and conviction, nor is it a matter of “personal opinion” alone. Rather, the statesman and the military leader are required to think, analyse, interpret facts and data, while balancing conflicting constraints, handling paradoxes, planning their next moves, responding to changes and facing uncertainty. This is the type of discourse required at the highest level of political-military business. Put simply, dealing with possible conflicts between perceptions, beliefs and facts is a fundamental part of the work. Instead of avoiding these tensions, one must make the most of all efforts to expose them.

One of the possible ways for dealing with the political recoil, is managing participants’ expectations of the joint war-game, and establishing it as a safe space for creative and open thinking. This way, the war-game may be regarded as suitable framework for free discussion, not bound by official protocol, allowing participants to express their thoughts openly in a frank manner and debate issues profoundly.[73]

Reducing political reluctance does not mean ignoring uncomfortable problems, and avoiding dilemmas or obfuscating them. The golden path here is to establish the war-game as a platform and as an “institution” for experiential learning, an intimate and informal framework for developing thought and raising questions, and not as another discussion concluded by defining the problems and actions. This approach clearly distinguishes between the war-game as a flexible framework for discussing open problems, and other discussions with less-flexible characteristics in which policy guidelines are given and biding military orders are issued.

This approach may reduce some of the potential “political risk” that may be perceived by some participants as associated with such war-games. Such arrangements will allow the creation of a “safe space”, and even of a non-binding “isolated bubble”, in which war-games can take place which will allow genuine, piercing deliberation, without fear of committing oneself to a particular decision or a particular action.  Fulfilling this vision of joint political-military war-games will therefore require a fine balance between conducting war-games in intimate forums, even compartmentalised ones, and the diversification of participants and viewpoints.

Developing a wider range of options for the participation and involvement of the elected political echelon in such war-games is in order. That is, on the scale of complete avoidance of participation on one end, and full participation on the other end, more intermediate options should be developed. The minimal objective should be to incorporate current senior officials who assist elected politicians. For example, the presiding National Security Adviser, the Cabinet Secretary, the Head of the Defence Ministry Political-Military Division and others according to the time and issue at hand. However, while these are senior officials working on the political side, they are not themselves elected representatives. The desired objective, therefore, should be holding war-games not only with those who advise and assist decision-making, but with those who are authorised to make decisions.

A war-game with the prime minister and/or defence minister would surely look different than a war-game that included additional cabinet ministers without close and continuous contact with the defence establishment. For the reasons stated earlier, it is doubtful that a war-game in which all the cabinet ministers “play themselves” is feasible. A more realistic starting point may be, for example, the participation (even if partial) of the prime minister and defence minister, followed by a more intimate discussion with the IDF Chief of Staff about the main insights gained from the game and its implications. Alternatively, politicians would observe the game-discussions in real-time, and a private consultation would be conducted between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff during the game.

More innovative and “bolder” means of involvement depend on the personal willingness of the prime minister and members of cabinet to surrender themselves to the role-play experience, not necessarily playing themselves, thus creating for themselves an alternative learning angle. 

Fulfilling the vision of joint political-military war-games as a space for a genuine shared learning requires flexibility and creativity in designing the suitable methodological response according to each subject and the ensemble of personalities assuming official positions at each time.

Conclusion

It is the constant challenge of prime ministers, defence ministers, and chiefs of staff to interpret the political-military dialogue. In turn, each one of them is required, in their own ways, to contribute substantively to this discussion with the challenges of the day and future-facing viewpoints. More often than not, it is a matter of operational necessity.

Highlighting the joint responsibility of the senior military and political echelons, as in this article, differs from the procedural approach often used to describe the necessary improvements required of politicians on defence and foreign affairs, or in their interaction with the IDF and the intelligence community. The procedural approach, for example, stresses the delivery of information (intelligence and other) to political decision-makers, who are seemingly required “only” to consider and choose one of several presented alternative courses of action.

By contrast, the shared responsibility approach draws from the unique authorities given to each echelon. It mandates deep study to utilise the political-military dialogue as a way of genuinely clarifying the tensions which are inherent in the relationships between: national interests and objectives; threats and opportunities; capabilities and limitations; freedom of action and constraints.

Traditionally, such discussions take place (when they do) in familiar formats, together with many maps, charts and the ubiquitous PowerPoint slides. This article places the strategic war-game as a supplementary approach and as an additional method of discussion that affords both political and military leaders the opportunity to learn together, and to learning about each other’s decision-making considerations. Viewed this way, the war-game may be an advantageous way of creating an advanced dialogue that improves political-military expectation management, and facilitates the development of relevant strategic and operational ideas.

As a basis for further discussion, the article makes several suggestions for dealing with possible politica reluctance to participate in such war-games. In addition to reducing the number of participants and conducting such games in a compartmentalized setting, it is also suggested that a perception of discussions in war-games as “safe spaces” for contemplation be established and fostered. That is, putting the war-game into some sort of an informal capsule, which even when dealing with crucial and urgent challenges, is nonetheless detached from the need to issue instructions and abiding orders. The distinction between learning through the war-game experience on the one hand, and formal act of instruction on the other hand, may allow for both the political and military echelons to discreetly produce new insights regarding the problems addressed, free from political “risks”. 

It was also suggested to expand the range of options for various degrees of involvement and participation for the elected political echelon, and creating flexible methodological response to meet the changing needs.

To conclude, while pointing at the absence of the elected political echelon from strategic war-games, this article emphasizes the potential of such games in establishing a system of joint learning, to improve political-military dialogue and national security decision-making. The need for such joint learning has only been amplified given the persistent disjunction between the traditional formats of discussion at the highest level of political-military activity (which have needed improvement now for over a generation), and the cognitive task that accompanies Israel’s security challenges, characterized by the multiplicity of factors, actors, conflicting interests and rapid changes. While the intellectual challenge of decision-making has not grown any simpler, the methodology of discussing such challenges at the highest levels has remained largely the same. A possible remedy, even if only a partial one, may be found in the use of various advanced methods of deliberation in which both echelons participate actively: scenario-based discussions, role-playing and, especially, the strategic war-game in its dynamic and elaborate format.

Such methodologies, already practiced in the senior ranks of the IDF, may additionally be used in support of accelerated political-military learning, allowing for both the political and military leaders to make the most of such discussions to address (not suppress) the many connections between the political and military levels of action in service of national security.

To Cite:  Tsalalyachin, Goor. ‘Strategic Wargaming and the Israeli Political-Military Dialogue’. The Dado Center Journal (DCJ) for Contemporary Issues in Operational Art, IDF Operations Directorate, no. 13: War-Games (October 2017). 

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Interviews:

• Dan Meridor, 27 March 2016
• Uzi Arad, 3 September 2017.

[1] Goor Tsalalyachin is Head of Strategic War-Games, IDF Operations Directorate, Dado Centre for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. He is responsible for the methodological design and facilitations of war-games played by the most senior commanders at the General Staff.

The thoughts, opinions and arguments presented in the text belong solely to the author, and do not constitute a formal position of any group, organisation or official entity.

Author’s Note: I remain thankful for the useful comments received from the following individuals who reviewed earlier drafts of this article: Dr Ohad Leslau, Brigadier General (Res) Assaf Orion, Major General (Res) Giora Eiland, Dana Preisler-Swery, Brigadier General (Res) Yoram Hamo, Yaniv Freidman, Brigadier General (Res) Jacob Nagel and Dr Anat Stern.

[2] Based on preliminary findings of a pilot survey conducted by the author in 2017 (unpublished, part of broader research in progress).

[3] ‘The Inaugural Address: Remarks of President Donald J. Trump – as Prepared for Delivery’, The White House (blog), 20 January 2017; Adam Quinn, ‘The World According to Trump’, The World Today, Chatham House, London, December 2016, 14–15.

[4] ‘We Are the Alt-World: At a Summit in Germany, Nationalism Goes International’, The Economist, 26 January 2017; Sheryl G. Stolberg and Brian M. Rosenthal, ‘Man Charged After White Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence’, New York Times, 12 August 2017; Charles Levin, ‘The Far Right Is Planning 9 Rallies Nationwide This Weekend Alone’, CNN, 16 August 2017; Simon Shuster, ‘European Politics Are Swinging to the Right’, Time, 22 September 2016; Peter Foster, ‘The Rise of the Far-Right in Europe Is Not False Alarm’, The Telegraph, 19 May 2016.

[5] Michael J. Mazzar, ‘The Once and the Future Order – What Comes After Hegemony?’, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations 96, no. 1 (February 2017): 25–32; Robin Niblett, ‘Liberalism in Retreat - The Demise of a Dream’, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations 96, no. 1 (February 2017): 17–24.

[6] Joshua Berlinger, ‘North Korea’s Missile Tests by the Numbers’, CNN, 18 September 2017.

[7] The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, 19 September 2017.

[8] Dmitri Ternin, ‘Russia in the Middle East: Moscow’s Objectives, Priorities and Policy Drivers’, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, 5.

[9] UNHCR, ‘Regional Strategic Review: Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017-2018 in Response to the Syria Crisis’ (United Nations, December 2016).

[10] Jared Malsin, ‘Yemen Is the Latest Victim of the Increase in Iran-Saudi Arabia Tension’, Time, 11 January 2016, sec. World; Bernhard Zand, Samiha Shafy, and Susanne Koelbl, ‘The Cold War of Islam’, Spiegel Online, 9 May 2016.

[11] Ray Takeyh, ‘Understanding Iran’s Mideast Role’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 1 October 2015); Raz Zimmt, ‘Spotlight on Iran (July 30 – August 13, 2017)’, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 2017, 7.No Reference

[12] Peter Neumann, Rajan Basra, and Claudia Brunner, ‘Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus’ (ICSR - King’s College London, October 2016).

[13] William H. Dutton, ‘Putting Things to Work: Social and Policy Challenges for the Internet of Things’, Info 16, no. 3 (2014): 1–21; Sameer Dixit, ‘Opportunity vs Risk with the Internet of Things’, Network Security, no. 12 (December 2016): 8–10.

[14] Cornish Paul, ‘Deterrence and the Ethics of Cyber Conflict’, ed. Mariarosaria Taddeo and Ludvica Glorioso (Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 1–16.

[15] Uzi Arad and Limor Ben-Har, NSC - the Struggle to Create and Transform the National Security Council (Israel: Kinnert, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir - Publishin House, 2016), 278.

[16] Molly Mckew and Eerik Niiles Kross, ‘The Dangerous Link Between Syria and Ukraine’, Politico, 22 September 2015; BBC News, ‘Ukraine Crimea: Russia Sends New Air Defence Missiles’ sec. Europe.

[17] Aaron David Miller, Richard Sokolsky, and Robert Malley, ‘How Trump’s Iran Threats Could Backfire in North Korea’, Politico, 7 August 2017.

[18] ‘Pillar of Defence – ISA Concluding Presentation 2012 [Hebrew]’, Israel Security Agency Website (blog), December 2012.

[19] Yoav Zitun, ‘Suspects in the Sea: Hamas’ Naval Commandos Planning Israel Attack’, Ynet News, 20 August 2015.

[20] Yoram Schweitzer, ‘Defining the Victor in the Fight against an Army of “Terrorilla”’, in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel-Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014), 22.

[21] ‘IDF Chief of Staff at the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committee [Hebrew Press Release]’ (The Knesset, 5 July 2017); ‘IDF Chief of Staff at the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committee [Hebrew Press Release]’.

[22] ‘The IDF Strategy’ (IDF Chief of the General Staff, July 2016), 28–29, English translation by IDF. Unclassified.

[23] Major General Herzi Halevy, Director of Israel Defense Intelligence (IDF Intelligence Directorate), ‘Israel in a Stormy Middle-East: Strategic Intelligence Assessment’, The 16th Herzliya Conference, 15 June 2016.

[24] Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise (New York: Penguin, 2012), 372.

[25] Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), xv.

[26] Nye, xvi–xvii.

[27] Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘How to Succeed in the Networked World - A Grand Strategy for the Digital Age’, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations 95, no. 6 (December 2016).

[28] Nye, The Future of Power, 32; The Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committee, ‘Special Report by the Force Development and Defence Doctrine Select Sub-Committee [Hebrew]’, September 2017, 10, HUZBIT-39-300.

[29] See forward by Yehoshafat Harcabi, p. A, inside: Yaniv, Avner ‘Politics and Strategy in Israel’ (Sifriyat Poalim publishing house, 1994). Amongst other position, Harcabi served as Director of Israel Defense Intelligence, a professor for international relations and Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was a Strategic Adviser to the Minister of Defense.

[30] Richard J. Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (USA: Central Intelligence Agency, the Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).

[31] Donella Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth - A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

[32] Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155–69.

[33] Kurt A. Richardson, Paul Cilliers, and Michael Lissack, ‘Complexity Science: A ‘Gray Science for the “Stuff in Between”’, in Thinking Complexity, vol. 1, Complexity & Philosophy (Mansfield USA: ISCE Publishing, 2007), 26.

[34] Arad and Ben-Har, NSC - the Struggle to Create and Transform the National Security Council, 278.

[35] Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 14–15.

 [36] The Knesset, ‘Basic Law: The Military’, 5736, 1976, A (2).

[37] A good example is, of course, the US Constitution: ‘The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.’ See: ‘Constitution of the United States’, 1787, sec. 2.

[38] Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (Simon & Schuster, 2002).

[39] Winston Churchill, World Crisis 1911-1918, Abridged and Revised Edition (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1930), 298.

[40] Churchill, 298.

[41] Carl Von Clauzswitz, On War (Vom Kriege), ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (USA: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86.

[42] The Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committee, ‘Special Report by the Force Development and Defence Doctrine Select Sub-Committee [Hebrew]’, 12.

[43] Shmuel Even and Kobi Michael, ‘Principles of the Israeli Political-Military Discourse Based on the Recent IDF Strategy Document’, Military and Strategic Affairs 8, no. 1 (July 2016): 33.

[44] Even and Michael, 36.

[45] Orion, Assaf, 'How to Use the State Comptroller's Report on Operation "Protective" Edge for Better Dealing with Israel's Future Challenges', Israel Defence, 28 March 2017 [Hebrew]

[46] Banjo, Yaakov and Segal, Giora 'The Operational Focus and the Strategic-Value Guided Action', Maarchot, no. 445 (June 2015) 4-13 [Hebrew].

[47] Email correspondence with Jacob Nagel, 4 September 2017. Nagel is currently a Visiting Professor in at the Technicon – Israel Institute of Technology, Aerospace Engineering Faculty.

[48] The State Comptroller’s Office, ‘Special Report: Cabinet Decision-Making Processes Concerning the Gaza Strip Before and at the Outset of Operation “Protective Edge” [Hebrew]’ (Jerusalem: The State of Israel, 2017), 15, 32–35.

[49] The State Comptroller’s Office, 42.

[50] Conversation with Dan Meridor, 27 March 2016. As cabinet member under several administrations, Meridor served as Minister of Justice, Minister of the Treasury and Minister of Intelligence Affairs.

[51] Conversation with Uzi Arad, 3 September 2017. Arad had previously served as head of the Mosad Intelligence Division, subsequently as the Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister as later as the Head of the National Security Council.

[52] ‘The Winograd Commission – Interim Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006 [Hebrew]’ (Jerusalem: The State of Israel, April 2007), 106.

[53] ‘The Winograd Commission – Interim Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006 [Hebrew]’, 111.

[54] ‘IDF Supreme Command Secretariat/Office of the Chief of Staff, Conclusions “Even Gazit” Exercise of 3 March 1969. Ref: 531-341-מנ.’, n.d., 15–16, Israel Ministry of Defence Archive. The author wishes to thank Mr Sam Bronfeld and to the MOD/IDF Archive personnel for their valuable assistance.

[55] ‘IDF Supreme Command Secretariat/Office of the Chief of Staff, Conclusions “Even Gazit” Exercise of .מנ-531-341.’, 15–16 :March 1969. Ref 3

[56] ‘IDF Supreme Command Secretariat/Office of the Chief of Staff, Conclusions “Even Gazit” Exercise of .מנ-531-341.’, 14 :March 1969. Ref 3

[57] ‘IDF Supreme Command Secretariat/Office of the Chief of Staff, Conclusions “Even Gazit” Exercise of .מנ-531-341.’, 20–21 :March 1969. Ref 3

[58] ‘IDF Supreme Command Secretariat/Office of the Chief of Staff, Conclusions “Even Gazit” Exercise of .מנ-531-341.’, 23–24 :March 1969. Ref 3

[59] ‘*** War-Game for the General Staff – Conclusions.’ (IDF, 1997). The planning order of the game indicates it was conducted in relation to IDF Central and Southern operational plans of the period. Accesses to the original documents was made possible thanks to the IDF/J3/History Department.

[60] Goor Tsalalyachin, Strategic War Games: Theory and Practice of War Games for the Development of Strategic-Operational Knowledge [Hebrew] (Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies (IDF, J3), 2016).

[61] Daniel F. Oriesek and Jan Oliver Schwarz, Business Wargaming - Securing Corporate Value (Surrey, England: Gower Publishing Limited, 2008), 1–2.

[62] Oriesek and Schwarz, 1–2.

[63] Robert D. Spectht, War Games (California: Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1957), 12.

[64] Peter P. Perla, ‘Operations Research, Systems Analysis and Wargaming: Riding the Cycle of Research’, in Zones of Control: Perspectives on Wargaming, ed. Pat Harrigan and Matthew G. Kirschenbaum (Cambridge,Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press, 2016), 173–74.

[65] Kees Van der Heijden, Scenarios – The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2nd ed. (United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005), 43.

[66] Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Eleventh printing 2008 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 141.

[67] ‘The Winograd Commission – Interim Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006 [Hebrew]’, 107.

[68] ‘The Winograd Commission – Interim Report of The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006 [Hebrew]’, 105–6.

[69] L. Irving Janis, Groupthink (Boston, USA: Wadsworth, 1982), 171.

[70] Janis, 196.

[71] Yossi Yehoshua, ‘Members of Cabinet Do Not Intend to Attend and Important Brief as Part of IDF Exercise [Hebrew]’, Ynet News, 13 September 2017, Online edition. The exercise to which the publication refers to is “Or Hadagan” - the largest military exercise held in the IDF Northern Command in 20 years (corpus level), preparing IDF forces for possible war with Hezbollah.

[72] Dan Meridor, interview.

[73] Melissa K. Dewey and Hank J. Brightman, ‘Trends in Modern War Gaming’, The Art of Conversation, US Navy War College Review, 67, no. 1 (2014): 17.