To Be a Military Leader - Major General Kochavi

From the Hebrew – Lt. Col. (res.) Marshall Grant.

This article, written by Major General Aviv Kochavi, the Chief of the General Staff, presents his perception of the image of a senior military leader in the IDF.  Military leaders, claims the Chief of the General Staff, are first and foremost required to lead themselves and their subordinates in the process of knowledge development for the unique reality the system they lead is facing, and to develop a response that is compatible for this new context.  Therefore, the military leader is required to be an intellectual, but also a person who is practical, one who can connect and lead their environment to implement the response, and one who is courageous enough to be self-critical and face criticism from their surroundings – and be willing to face these gaps and be courageous enough to change them.

The article presents understandings and lessons learned from the experience of the Chief of the General Staff after leading several systemic learning processes throughout his career, including the importance of learning in a tightly unified and dedicated group, the need to invest time and effort to develop productive discussions, and the need to regard the implementation stage as part of the learning process itself.

Introduction

The term “generalship” or “military leader” brings to mind an image of a revered commander, the leader of a campaign – usually on a large scale, where the source of their authority and decisions is based on military doctrine, current military knowledge and their extensive experience.  This is true, but this dilutes the term and conceals a much more important issue that differentiates and distinguishes the senior military leader from the tactical level: military leaders must first lead themselves and their subordinates to develop knowledge in the unique reality their system is facing, and develop a suitable response for the new context.  The military leader operates on the strategic level in which existing knowledge and experience hold great importance, but they are not sufficient in any shape or form.

Strategic military leaders are always unique people who have evolved from many elements and circumstances, some of which only become evident in hindsight.  Therefore, the most important requirement that distinguishes between senior officers, military leaders and their subordinate command levels, is the clarification of a unique reality.  A unique reality is characterized by the fact that it is different and the past experience of the commander and their unit only partially serve them, and could even mislead them at times.  The interpretation and organization of reality as a system of new understandings and reaching a compatible operational solution are, therefore, the main and most critical requirement from the military leader. Military leaders, due to the simple fact that they operate in a complex strategic environment, will always face one-time situations they have never faced before (as opposed to circumstances that repeat themselves).  Each of these situations has a broader, systemic context that is new and distinct.  Consequently, compared to their subordinate levels, the military leader is unable to rely on past events, familiar templates or accumulated experience.  They can learn from them, but they must adapt themselves and their units with new skills: analysis and understanding of the newly evolving complex reality, and the development of an original and relevant approach to cope with it.

Military leaders are first and foremost required to lead themselves and their subordinates in the process of knowledge development for the unique situation in the system and to develop a response that is compatible for this new context.  

My personal experience has taken me and the units I have commanded to several of these systemic investigative journeys. As the head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, we constructed a modern intelligence concept, including Intelligence-based Combat (IBC) and “Network Intelligence”. As commander of the Northern Regional Command, in light of the civil war in Syria and the many changes that had taken place in Hezbollah, we developed the strategy of “the Knowledge Arrow”. As Deputy Chief of the General Staff, we held an important learning process concerning the IDF’s force design and its conclusions were applied, inter alia, in the Tnufa five-year plan. All of these processes expressed organizational learning, at the center of which were systemic investigation and the development of a compatible response to the unique situation.

The point of this discussion is to present the main lessons I have learned from these processes and from my military experience concerning the subject military leadership.

The Military Leader as a Leader of Organizational Learning – Five Initial Observations

Observation I – I will be presenting my thoughts and understandings from my experience. There are additional ways to deal with complex and unique situations in large organizations.

Observation II – a word about the arts. Any person who creates is familiar with the tendencies of artists who reach the peak of their identification with their work at the moment of its completion. But this identification only lasts for a short time. Then comes the process of “distancing” from the work as a result of self-criticism and change. Years later, the artist may find themselves critically asking, “I created that?” This is a good quality that promotes learning.

Observation III – change compared to the need for stability.  A senior commander operates in an environment characterized as “an open system”, comprised of a myriad of components that influence one another and frequently change. People, especially those in large systems and organizations, find it difficult to live in a reality where “everything flows” and changes all the time.  This is a challenging demand, to live with the continuous feeling that world is no longer “the same world”, even from the moment we convened to talk in this room.  Even as the commander of the IDF, I operate with the deep awareness that the system under my responsibility is changing all the time – it is certainly not the same system it was when I began my command of the military, and it will not be the same system when my tenure comes to an end.  On the other hand, the profession of command and management requires stability, a method, procedures, doctrine, the creation of anchors and unchanging specialties.  This practice is critical and necessary, but it could be used to hamper learning and block change and innovation.  On one hand, senior commanders understand that the organization requires stability, but on the other hand, stability and a method are the opposite of contextual modification and change.

Observation IV is related to the concept of evolvement.  When a person lives with the awareness that many things are always in motion and evolving, they are completely charged with the incentive and drive to learn.  They understand the need to investigate the situation, to understand what has changed and identify the forces in motion and relationships between them.  In complex systems, such as the one in which we are operating, on the senior, systemic level, it is insufficient to only identify the actors in the system.  All the phenomena in the situation, and their impact on it, must also be understood.  Quite often the phenomena are more dominant than the actors and their interests.  The actors take action to achieve a certain goal, but the phenomena have their own force, and they could lead the actors to a different place.

For example, prior to the first world war, the European monarchs were composed of rational actors.  However, the events that unfolded originated from tactical coincidences when the heir to the throne was assassinated in Sarajevo after his car took the wrong route, where happened to meet the murderer by chance.   This led to a series of decisions, some of which contradicted the interests and positions previously held by the actors.   It was this given coincidence that led the decision makers to feel that they had no choice but to make the decisions they made, and the rest is history.  This is also the reason that the main characteristic of senior command is performance in circumstances that are completely unique and have limited periods of validity.  Many similar cases can be found throughout history where a random occurrence created an unexpected unique situation.  This was the case, for example in Operation Protective Edge and how we approached the campaign.  All of these cases have one common denominator – the situation is unique, new, there is no identical precedence, and it will not reoccur in the same way again. This situation is very different from the tactical level in which battalion and brigade commanders can find themselves in situations very similar to those they have experienced in the past.

Observation V is based on the well-known quote by Albert Einstein:  “If I were given 60 minutes to solve a problem, I would spend 59 minutes defining it.”  This quote has many versions, but in essence points to the fact that only deep diagnosis of a given situation will enable quality prognosis.  Analysis and diagnosis of the situation is the most significant component when defining the response.  Our traditional education tends to be “bottom-up”.  In other words, to be supported by existing doctrine and precedence we are familiar with in order to find a solution.  In a lecture in the officers academy last week, I told them that they needed to train themselves to make split-second decisions.  This is the period of time they have to make decisions on the battlefield.  Our ability to make these fast decisions is based on “recalling existing information from memory, from the drawers of organizational knowledge, combat doctrines, precedence and known and familiar concepts.  This is a necessary technique for both combat and combat-support officers on the tactical level.  But this method is unhelpful for senior officers, and this is not unique behavior that is required from senior military leaders.  Generalship on the systemic level in not based on existing knowledge of the present situation – it must be developed.  The military leader needs to think “top-down”.  Not instead of tactical thinking and experience, but parallel to it.  They are required to define the terminology of the situation in which they are operating by clarifying to themselves, by themselves, basic questions, such as, “What is the meaning of the current situation?”, “What is exactly the essence of the problem I am facing?”, “What are the components of the situation and the challenge?” and “What is the unique response that is required?”.

We are dealing with organizational learning.  I had the honor of studying with a world renowned “learning guru”, Peter Senge, who wrote the book The Fifth Discipline.  As a consultant to Ford, he led a unique group that developed the Ford Tauris – a car that became the most sold car in the automobile history.  Senge led one of two competing groups created by Ford to develop “the next model”.  They called themselves the “Epsilon Project” and it was defined as confidential.  Following of more than a year of teamwork, they presented their findings to management, but the team’s members brought nothing tangible to show except a collection of general ideas.  The company’s management almost disbanded the team.  The next 18 months were invested in mutual efforts and a “sprint” that led to the development of the Tauris – a direct result of the general ideas that were previously presented. Senge didn’t “team build” as is taught in the world of sports. He spent the first a year and a half investing in building an infrastructure for learning – trust amongst the team members, development of common knowledge, mutual investigation of the subject and very deep diagnosis that led to innovative ideas and eventually to a product of the highest quality. In other words, a deep learning and creative process cannot take place without team cohesion that is based on pure professionalism that includes trust and skills for learning.  Only if all of these are present can original and groundbreaking thought take place.

Following these five observations, I will now get to the heart of the discussion: What characterizes a senior commander? What is their role? What are their qualities? Concerning the subject we have come to discuss, the senior commander is first and foremost one who understands that there is no existing knowledge that can be "taken out of a hat", and they have the responsibility for developing their knowledge and that of their units. In areas such as the Golan Heights, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip there will always be a unique reality that requires a unique response. The development of combat methods against a changing enemy requires adjustments that will create relevance for victory. All these explain why all-encompassing knowledge for different sectors and challenges simply does not exist.

The schools training officers have a huge role in providing the basis of professional knowledge, but senior leaders are in a place where they can no longer only rely on knowledge that was previously acquired during training, in schools, in advanced studies or from their experience. Senior leaders are in a position where their performance, by definition, takes place within new and complex contexts. They must themselves develop their own knowledge structure and that of their units, and to be responsible for the learning policy. They must carry out a routine of learning that includes relevant interpretation and defining new relevant content for the unique situation in which they are operating.

From Interpretation to a New Concept

The issue of interpretation is fundamental: the senior commander deals with the creation of knowledge. This means not to adopt existing models and not to duplicate an existing paradigm, but to create interpretation and a new concept. Their ability to be effective and relevant depends on their ability to provide accurate and relevant interpretation to the evolving circumstances. This interpretation can be considered as abstract on one hand, or it can be simple and illustrative on the other. For example, the foundations of the operational concept for victory and the five-year Tnufa plan came after we critically examined ourselves in the beginning of 2019 and then created this interpretation. We analyzed the IDF and created terminology as a military mainly built as a traditional-industrial military that was geared for several decades "to be worn" as a suffocating ring against the enemy's industrial military (e.g. Syria or Egypt). The battle at Abu Ageila in 1967 is a clear example - Sharon's division represented a military whose units were modified for the threat, and together with stratagem, courage and leadership, were victorious.

The geometric description that we created in illustrations of the Tnufa five-year plan, in which there was one shape (a blue "ח") that "covered" and "strangled" another shape (a red "square"), not only represented an industrial enemy military and describes the IDF's order of battle, it also emphasized the IDF's modification for the threat. However, since that historical moment, the enemy's "square" has become a complex geometrical shape full of angles and "thorns", and the IDF's geometric shape has become more challenged. The illustration became terminology intended for the Tnufa plan. In essence, the simple illustration is actually an interpreted structure that describes the reality and serves as a critical diagnosis for our situation.

Four geometric shapes that express interpretation for the level of the IDF's compatibility to the military threats it faced in the past and still faces.

Organizational Courage

The subject of new interpretation brings me to another issue the military leader must address - courage. Not the type of courage needed on the battlefield - a different type of courage that is often no less daunting. The courage to look yourself in the mirror and say harsh things to yourself. Not only to voice them to yourself, but to practice generalship and recruit your comrades and openly tell them the same things - in a loud voice, to the entire group and the entire organization. In the workshop regarding the the current operational concept, we placed ourselves in front of the mirror and said, in a clear voice, things that for years had never been said outside meeting rooms: there is a gap between the reality and the response! Not the type of gaps that can be filled with additional resources or training, but gaps relating to how we perceive reality, gaps in how we are designing our forces, and gaps that require to IDF to make material adjustments and deep changes in its conceptualization and realization. It was not easy, not for the group and certainly not for me.  It would have been easier to have been critical and criticize when you are sitting high in the grandstands, but it's not easy when you are the one who is leading the group and a very critical discussion, and not when you are commander of the military who could be called to war the next morning and will have to demonstrate its abilities, determination and above everything else, confidence and willingness.

The Double Role of the Senior Commander

As commander of the military I am responsible for the development of my own knowledge and for the shared knowledge of the IDF's commanding echelon. We are developing it by means of critical observation that allows a certain situation, shifts or gaps, and the directions of change we are required to follow to be outlined. At the same time, I am the commander and you are my subordinates, and I am confidently telling both you and myself that if tomorrow morning we find ourselves is a war, we will be victorious!

There could be a gap between these two statements, but is a gap that every senior officer must live with all the time. This is tension that the art of senior command must know how to manage and overcome. I have the duty to deal with the shifts and gaps we discovered, and at the same time I have the continuous task to maintain constant readiness of our forces and to maintain their belief in their abilities and their unwavering willingness to fight and win. The rule needs to be "Victorious with what we have" and "Always improving what we have". Moreover, if we go back to the artist, who over time identifies less and less with their work, we also must ask ourselves in several years if any of the terms we defined are still valid. Some of them will need to be modified again. This is an unending process that requires a balance between change and readiness, between procurement and implementation, between stability and continuity. Why then, is there no gap between "the shift" that was revealed and tomorrow's victory? Since we will win based on all the things we have now, by means of existing abilities, and we will win faster and more decisively after completing the improvement and implementing the changes that underline the shift's assessed characteristics.

But in the face of the obligation to learn and change all the time, there are also practices of organizational management. Large organizations are also unable to accept direction changes every few months, and not even every year. Organizational structures cannot be frequently changed, nor can combat methods be changed every two-three years. Therefore, on the level of senior command, methods to manage the change are also required: the scope, content and pace.

Group Learning

We have a tendency, as commanders, to draw inspiration from prominent historical military leaders, and we afford them personal qualities: their deep understanding of the battlefield, charisma, systemic vision and brilliant ideas. This inclination is justified, and they deserve the credit. However, basing success on personal characteristics is a mistake. In a complex reality, group learning is the key to success. This is a powerful tool that Judaism understood and adopted. The building of a new knowledge system is creation – nothing less. This is complex creation, and its focus is not only processing large amounts of material, but mainly the ability to understand the situation deeply and take away important and relevant understandings. In the case of a military - to develop an operative response.

The importance of group learning stems from several complementing sources: firstly, more minds, more diverse angles, more varied ways of thinking, and the significance of all of these is more ideas in the room. This is not only wisdom of the crowd as it is often presented today, it is mainly the greater level of creativity a group has and in open brainstorming. Secondly, the product created during that brainstorming session, when accepted and processed and authorized by the commander, is a shared product. The level of the group's commitment towards the common product is completely different from the idea that was created in another place or only in the head of the commander. On senior levels, an order is a motivating and important factor, but it is not enough.   The joint idea that was produced is an idea whose ability to attract and harness commitments from others, which increases the chances of it being realized. Thirdly, a group creates together, develops a common language for itself and deep learning for each and every of its members. This is very meaningful unity, whose importance is not only in regards to misunderstandings, which always happen, but also as a solid base that enables additional growth of knowledge in other circles. Fourthly, a shared process, shared thoughts, multiple angles of perception create a better idea! Not only a stronger and better idea, but also a common idea. Not everyone sees and interprets the "mammoth" from their narrow perspectives, but everyone contributes to the joint picture which can be used to continue, expand and further the knowledge and the response.

In order to succeed in this kind of a group learning process, real willingness in needed on behalf of the commander to facilitate open and critical learning. In order the group will be an active learning group, it needs to create a common knowledge base for themselves. This infrastructure is created when there is agreement on the methodology of the learning and relies on in-depth briefings, which are regular and methodical, and in which all the group's members are present.

Group learning is very, very significant and it is worthwhile to for every unit or body to also involve the echelons above it: the regional command will include the general staff, and the division will include the regional command. It is also sensible to integrate other professionals in the process: the Intelligence Directorate, the Air Force, etc. At the end of the process, all the participants in the process will become critical agents of change, both for the understandings that were developed, and for the need and implementation.

From everything you have heard until now, you understand that time is necessary. The cohesion of the learning group, the processing of content and the creation of a new knowledge structure require time to mature - just like a good stew cannot be made in a microwave.

Structuring a Productive Discussion

And now something on the ability to learn from professionals and experts who do not serve in the organization. Knowledge almost always develops from within a unique perspective of a person who holds a position and bears responsibility for the task at hand. One needs to bear the weight of responsibility and sense the obligation towards a problem in order to cope with the challenge and have an effective learning process. The expectation that experts, who are not part of the circle of responsibility, will think for us, "sit in the boat with us" and scream "Eureka!" is an unrealistic expectation. When I began my position as the chief of the general staff, I spoke with dozens of former senior functionaries. Very serious people with years of experience and extensive knowledge, all had diverse thoughts and ideas. But only when I presented to the person with whom with I was speaking my emerging concept, the network of cognitive coordinates I was developing for myself before beginning the position, and only when I illustrated to them the conceptual framework of logic that had been developing in my mind at the time, only then did the discussion become deeper and more productive. The experts, senior and well experienced, both past and present, were able to further assist me in building knowledge and interpretation and contributed much more once I laid down the overall logical framework I had created. So, on one hand, don't rush to disconnect from the experts and those with experience - just know how to use their assistance wisely. Senior officers must be able to know how to manage the group they are working with in general, and the talents of the experts while doing so, specifically. Remember that the deep and industrial knowledge is developed by you and by other senior officers with whom you work, but it is mainly the result of your role that bears the burden of responsibility. The heavier the weight of responsibility, the deeper the analysis must be. You need to dive deep in order to bring new ideas from the ocean’s depths, when the weight of responsibility is pulling you down.

Instilling Knowledge

What is the meaning of a tree that fell in a forest clearing and no one saw or heard it fall? In similar fashion, there is no significance in knowledge that you developed by yourself for yourself. In addition, knowledge that is developed by a small team you lead is the same as a tree that falls in the forest. Knowledge development must be implemented. You are leading large organizations. If it is a campaign in Gaza, and if it is a branch, service, armor division or the entire IDF. We are leading large organizations

At the end of the day, we are learning not to be captivated by the depth of understandings and creativity in the concept we have developed, but in order to renew, to implement and be relevant and effective. In order to succeed we need to reach and connect with all those involved - in your organization and in other organizations (branches) that are involved.

and complex systems that must develop knowledge and create a common foundation of understanding that is as broad as possible. I previously mentioned the advantages of knowledge development in a team, but there is another deeper aspect. In the case of the IDF, the people with whom the knowledge is being developed are the same people who will execute it in combat. The knowledge that we are required to develop in order to be effective is not "objective" knowledge that can be read in a book, learned, understood and then action taken accordingly. If knowledge that is unique to a specific context will be developed without the lead group that is required to execute the knowledge, the damage could exceed the advantages. Knowledge that is developed solely by you or by a small group, and not disseminated to lower levels, will enable you to "take off", to develop new ideas and invent a new method of operation, but the people around you and under your command will remain behind. You will speak to them and they won't understand you; you will explain and to them it will sound strange. This is also the moment in which the most prolific form of defense against new ideas awakens - cynicism. Cynicism is the "Iron Dome" against change, and it pushes questions and new ideas away and allows those feeling threatened to continue and march along the lines that are already drawn while wrapping themselves in what they consider wisdom and what is right. Cynicism and closure, in the negative sense, hamper learning and change, and in the worst case, are stubborn obstacles that detract from improved effectiveness.

How do You Create a Learning Group?

The development of knowledge in a group is not at all trivial. A high level of openness and trust is required between the members of the group, as is maturity and systemic vision. These are qualities that without them the courage to newly reexamine things cannot be expressed - to admit gaps, some of which are material, and point out shifts. Creating group knowledge is not only a rational process, it has a deep emotional dimension that evokes emotional responses: suspicion, anger, frustration, expectations and identification. "So what are you telling me now, that my corps isn't relevant? The we aren't good enough or efficient enough in urban warfare?" Revealing gaps and shifts of this type evoke many emotions. On one hand, the must be allowed, and on the other hand, they must be kept within a framework, made more moderate and examined in context - but mainly, they must be turned into something constructive. Emotions have to be turned into motivation for learning by strengthening the need to change.

A senior learning group can create "diamonds". But if these do not reach all echelons of the organization an implemented in them, then the process and the knowledge will be for naught.

In order to develop a knowledge community that is able to overcome their barriers and skirt cynicism, leadership is required that is able to promote learning.  Therefore, change also cannot be achieved for a real mission via ad hoc systems. No one is able to evoke and lead relevant systemic thought without bearing responsibility and leading the relevant group for the challenge.  There could be random consultants, clever participants, philosophers and intellects who assist in the development of unique knowledge, but their assessment – for a moment, or for a specific mission, without bearing the responsibility, is impossible.  This conclusion is even more valid if following the stage of developing knowledge, the issue must be promoted and there is a need to “move something in the world”.  Deep knowledge only develops from the position of responsibility, as is the realization and execution of the knowledge.  If we return to the Epsilon group, Peter Senge understood that he is unable to reach a diagnosis, certainly not a prognosis, without being able to prepare the group for learning processes. He knew that without creating an attentive and open group, one whose members trust each other, he would never reach the deep analysis required and would be unable to produce an original solution. From a young age in the military, including senior courses, we are investing much time to leadership, but we deal less, if at all, with the aspects of leadership that develops knowledge.  This is a daunting challenge, and in every unit and organization we must develop the skills for group learning in general, and the senior leaders’ skills for leading learning processes specifically.

We held in the past, in the Northern Command, a process of knowledge development that is very similar to that you have completed here in the course.  In order to illustrate the idea of a “learning group” and its required scope, I will present the relevant details to you.  Prior to the process, I sat with all the relevant heads of divisions and services in the general staff and I explained to them that this is a knowledge development process that obligates the participants, and it touches on all aspects of the northern sector.  Moreover, I approached the then Chief of the General Staff and updated him of the process and its significance, and added that even though I understand how busy he was, I suggested that he will instruct the heads of the general staff divisions and services to take part in the process.  “I will be your Dep. Chief of the General Staff for issues relating to the Northern Command,” I told him.  "I will develop the knowledge with the general staff, and for the general staff, and I will connect you to the understandings that emerge throughout the process." The process began, and once every two-three weeks we met for two days of learning. At the same time, I made it a point to hold a meeting with the general staff forum once every two months in order to share the knowledge with them.  We did not bring all of our knowledge we had developed to the general staff as a final product.  The opposite is true, we structured the meetings as dialogues.  I was not interested in more meetings in which the regional command presents it concept relating to a challenge, then presents the solution, division of missions and forces, and that’s it – off to work.  This approach does not create common understanding, and on the senior levels in which we are working, and in environments in which we are performing, this does not only not help, it hampers and obstructs.

The process achieved very good results in the Northern Command, and partial results with the general staff.  Following all the effort that I have just described, I must admit that in my judgement, I failed with at least half of the members of the general staff.  Some of them did not delve deep enough into the issues, others were not with us throughout the entire process, and there were some who were inconsistent towards the learning journey. That is why the issue of leadership and commitment to learning, and leading the learning group - some of which is not homogeneous, is so essential. At the end of the day, we are learning not to be captivated by the depth of understandings and creativity in the concept we have developed, but in order to renew, to implement and be relevant and effective. In order to succeed we need to reach and connect with all those involved - in your organization and in other organizations (branches) that are involved.

Sharing and Commitment

From here to the practices of learning management and its implementation in large organizations. One of the most serious challenges in very large organizations is the skill of implementing the understandings and communicating with the organization. Let's assume, as opposed to the story I just told, that all members of the general staff are partners to the process and are exposed to the knowledge and understandings, and a network of understandings and conclusions develops that is shared by everyone. The new knowledge does become part of the general staff, but it is only for a small group who was part of the learning process. Thefore, there is a strong need to share and implement the new knowledge and understandings to many other echelons, and modify the information and conclusions for each level according to its unique needs and capabilities. The process of change requires it partners to be commanders of staff divisions, departments and desks; of combat divisions, brigades and bases, and amongst commanders in all the branches and services. Their influence on the success of the process is directly related to their level of understanding and identification. The challenge in realizing deep change processes deviates from the narrow perspective of organizational communication. A commander's document or single lecture will not lead to deep understanding and identification with the new concept.

Systemic knowledge in general, and new knowledge specifically, is a world unto itself. In order to connect it to all the relevant puzzles in the organization, extensive, deep and methodical communications and explanations are required. A senior learning group can create "diamonds". But if these do not reach, and are not implemented in, all echelons of the organization, then the process and the knowledge will be for naught. The new concept and new work plan need to connect and captivate the entire organization so all those involved will develop weapons, combat methods and drills, modify the organization's structure, etc. Only the deep implementation of, and the commitment towards, the understandings while creating identification will create the incentives for the entire organization to carry out the required changes.

The implementation process must include a variety of methods and resources: commander circulars, written depth briefs, filmed lectures, symposiums, round tables, workshops, open discourse amongst officers, etc. This is a broad and continued effort intended to verify that all those involved understand the conclusions, correctly interpret them, develop identification and implement them as required. Moreover, by means of communication with all levels of command, questions are created and direct and indirect discourse develops that clarifies ideas, clarifies misunderstandings and clarifies, for both sides, all the way up to me as the Chief of the General Staff, what requires enhancing, improvement, updates and even reevaluation.

Repairing an Airplane while Airborne

The realization of change does not end with good organizational communication and implementing the understandings and knowledge. These are mandatory prerequisites to effectively lead change, but the highest test is the execution of the plan. On the other hand, we don't have the privilege to stop the military, then change, improve, develop and then continue. As opposed to a civilian organization, we don't have the option to cease the production of a specific product, develop and new model and return to the market at a time it is convenient for us.

When the military or various military organizations carry out changes, they need to continue to provide security. The IDF, which continuously deals with six sectors with six dimensions, is an organization that has no choice to but to continue to stay on its guard, to collect intelligence, to protect and attack and to do this effectively, while at the same time, it needs to carry out processes of change and innovation. Significant changes in the IDF (or in a branch, service or command) is similar to repairing an airplane while airborne, or to repair a watch while it is still operating. The IDF is required to develop a new engine or improved wings for the airplane during its flight.

And from the metaphor to real life - how is it done? In general, there are three categories for significant organizational change.

The first is the addition of new capabilities that can integrate in the existing structure and with the existing resources. In this case, there is no dilemma, and there are no significant challenges. For example, a concept for realizing swarms of drones can be implemented without changing anything in the way the military and its units operate.

The second category includes large projects that require the replacement of existing capabilities and resources (e.g. network structure, providing intelligence to end users, digital transformation, and more).     In this case, a schedule is defined to develop and operationally implement precise "one-on-one" replacement methods. The process always includes risks, but detailed and thorough planning will reduce them.

There is an additional category for the implementation of capabilities and a configuration freeze for a defined period of time, and so forth. Large organizations must balance between change and stability. The correct balance depends on the situational awareness picture and the judgment of each organizational commander.

Each of the categories I mentioned obligates planning that is appropriate for the type of new capability, project or weapon system. Every planning event of this type is a world unto itself and requires professionalism, cooperation and determination.

The transition from concept to a plan is very important, and it lays the grounds for the execution stage. Successful ideas and innovative concepts throughout history, and quite often in the IDF, were not realized or collapsed during the "marathon" stage. This occurred because the realization plans suffered from opposition, incorrect planning or implementation that was not determined, decisive, committed and adaptive. The test of realization is the highest of tests, and methods of realization are doctrine themselves, which is not related to this discussion, but it is unique doctrine when it addresses change and innovation on a large scale.

From an Idea to Realization and from Realization to an Idea

The realization and execution process is a separate learning process. In every realization process friction is created following the meeting between the theoretical concept with the real world. This type of meeting will always result in difficulties, which raises opportunities that must be monitored, assessed, learned from, improved and modified during realization. The planning and execution stages both almost always give way to new understandings, new ideas, and they are the source of learning itself. In addition, even the most difficult of challenges that could arise during the implementation stage can be opportunities for learning.

An example of this could be seen in the process of organizational change the Intelligence Directorate is underwent, Ma’ase Aman, during 2014-2011 concerning organizational jointness. The goal of change was to create a networked intelligence directorate, which was also the name of the project. There was supposed to be complete connectivity and jointness between all intelligence units and the other IDF services. A year after the start of the realization stage, we realized that we are not advancing as expected, which is an understatement. We stopped the process, we held a holistic investigation and serious clarifications were achieved. We eventually had to admit that not only was the strategy we had chosen incorrect, the very concept we had created was simply not good enough, and an improved version was needed. We continued to investigate, we continued to learn and we defined a completely new concept and implementation method. From that point, the pace of realization increased and the concept was finally on the right track. In other words, in broad organizational processes (an in local processes) the realization stage is an incubator for new ideas by itself, and a stage where openness, flexibility and a willingness to continue learn and change are required.

Summary - The Military Leader as an Intellectual

If we can use Einstein as an example, that we can say the following:

1. "59 minutes" - the diagnosis, clarification and investigation stage is the key for a quality solution and relevant military response.
2. He also said, "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them." Therefore, deep and thorough clarification and investigation of the situation are required that produce new tools, terms and languages. Hence, deep investigation that is both critical and refreshing is the key to significant change.

Kurt Lewin^[2] coined the phrase "There is nothing more practical than a good theory". A good theory is the result of deep investigation, and it is only created by means of deep learning, sharing and multiple points of view. Processes of this kind are a clear expression of generalship. I have said in the past, and I will say again, what is often taken for granted - the test of realization is the supreme test, but only a relevant theory that is compatible with the situation and to the challenges at hand will enable an acceptable response. Investigation that results in a new theory requires intellectual efforts, so the basic requirement of a military leader, who has never faced unique and complex situations, is to be an intellectual. A commander on the tactical level finds a solution from an existing tool box and past experience. The military leader creates their own unique knowledge and designated set of tools that has been modified for the one-time situation now being faced. The senior command is obligated to think systemically, which means intellectually. Strategic circumstances (the political and military situation, the sector, the enemy) will always be unique; the information and technology will always change and the risks and opportunities will pop up all the time. All of these require critical thinking, knowledge development, the creation of knowledge, and the implementation and application of the knowledge. Everything I described is nothing more than a complex multi-branched and multi-dimensional intellectual process in which no senior commander has the privilege to ignore or try to simplify it in an artificial way.

Strategic generalship has always been complex, and in the modern age it is even more complex, but also offers many more opportunities. In order to successfully cope with all of these, generalship that has an intellectual approach at its foundation is what is needed.

The military leader is tested according to their ability to identify a situation, to change and to modify the strategy to the unique situation. In order to complete this successfully, they must lead deep group learning and determined, creative and committed implementation. All of these obligate the military leader to be an intellectual, a person of action and courageous:

• An intellectual who identifies a "unique" situation, who investigates and develops knowledge and a unique response.
• A person of action - who causes the others to be committed and leads execution.
• Courageous - willing to be critical and recognize the shifts, and dares to change (even in the face of opposition and the undertaking of risks).

footnote:

^[2] Psychologist. Considered one of the pioneers in the field of social psychology and a person whose ideas in this field and in the field of organizational psychology still greatly influences other areas, such as group dynamics, experimental learning and action research.