While You're Busy Making Other Plans – The ‘Other RMA’

DADO Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israel Defense Forces
 

ABSTRACT This study argues that, in parallel to the developments in the West over the last three decades, several nations and organizations on ‘the other side of the hill’ have also undertaken a significant development in their military thought. This conceptual development is referred to in the study as the ‘Other RMA’ (‘O-RMA’). This study aims to identify and describe O-RMA, to analyze the learning process that led to it and to trace its intellectual origins. This ‘way of war’, whose roots lie in a series of dramatic and tumultuous events that took place in the Middle East between the years 1979 and 1982, is based on the following components: Improving absorption capability, in order to increase survivability and provide a breathing space for the ‘weaker side’, creating effective deterrence, in order to deter the ‘stronger side’ from attacking the ‘weaker side’ and shifting the war to more convenient areas in case this deterrent fails; and winning the war by not losing it, while creating an attrition effect. O-RMA is an exceptionally eclectic conception and its development was not intentional or systematic. This study claims that the main ideas that underlie this conceptual development evolved within the different elements, while maintaining a common image, concerning the military, technological, economic, social and political developments in the West during the 1990s.

KEY WORDS: Middle East, Military Thought, Changes in Warfare, Terrorism, Insurgency, Guerrilla, Revolution in Military Affairs

Life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans.

John Lennon, Beautiful Boy, 1980

It is customary to assume that since the 1970s, there have been three major milestones of military innovation in the West. During the 1980s, military theory and practice revolved around concepts such as Air-Land Battle (ALB) and Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA); in the 1990s, discussions revolved around the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) concept; and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the discourse on Transformation and its components, such as Effects-Based Opera- tions (EBO) and Network Centric Warfare (NCW), has attracted the most attention. The hub of these conceptual discussions was in the US, yet the implications were broader and at the same time similar discussions were held in security establishments in other countries including Israel.

This study argues that, in parallel to the developments in the West over the last three decades, a number of nations and organizations on ‘the other side of the hill’ have also undertaken a significant development in their military thought. One version of the outcomes of this development was described in 2008 by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, in the following way: ‘A new school of warfare, it doesn’t resemble anything we know’.[1] This conceptual development is referred to in the study as the ‘Other RMA’ or ‘O-RMA’.[2] This study aims to identify and describe O-RMA, to analyze the learning process that led to it and to trace its intellectual origins. The study concentrates mainly on the Middle East and, more specifically, deals with a group of states, including Syria, Iraq and Iran, as well as a group of non-state entities, including Hizballah, Hamas and Al- Qa’eda.

Since the late 1990s, a comprehensive discussion relating to changes in the nature of the opponents and to the broader changes in the nature of warfare has been developed in the West. Nevertheless, it seems that a more systematic approach to the phenomenon referred to in this study as O-RMA is lacking. This study describes the unique ‘learning community’ that evolved around this innovation. It maintains that the current tactical patterns of these states and other entities share a broad common denominator that is not coincidental. These tactical patterns of warfare stem directly from common strategic and operational concepts that were developed during the 1990s, and have been evolving since then. The type of warfare Israel encountered in Lebanon (in 2006) and in the Gaza Strip (in 2009) is a clear and challenging outcome of the conceptual development referred to in this study as O-RMA.

At the heart of this study stands the claim that the roots of O-RMA lie in a series of dramatic and tumultuous events that took place in the Middle East between the years 1979 and 1982. These events (the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the start of the Iran–Iraq War and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon) changed the political and social order in the region, and led to the formation of a ‘radical axis’ and a ‘learning community’ of states and organizations that are in conflict with the United States and Israel. Even though not all the elements in this radical axis share the same ideological and political vision, they do share the operational and strategic concepts that lie at the center of the conceptual development, and therefore they employ similar tactical patterns.

This study makes use of primary materials in Arabic and Farsi that reflect the development of O-RMA, the threat assessment underlying it and the perspective of its developers on the process that led to it. The study is based on a wide selection of statements, speeches, books, fatwas, letters and other documents that were released over the past three decades. The textual approach is complemented by a detailed analysis of the modes of operation and force design practiced by these elements. This enables an understanding of O-RMA, integrating theory and practice.

Upheaval and Crisis (1979–1991)

Upheaval (1979–1982)

Military historians and practitioners describe the influences of the Yom Kippur War, in October 1973, on the doctrinal developments in the US Army during the 1970s, and especially on the doctrine of ALB. Yet, it is clear nowadays that when General Donn Starry and other officers learned the lessons from the Israeli battles against the Syrians on the Golan Heights, winds of change were already blowing in the Middle East. These winds would, in turn, lead some regional elements to develop a form of warfare that would turn out to be very different from the one carried out by Syria in 1973. Between 1979 and 1982, when the ALB doctrine was formed and the FOFA concepts were articulated,[3] four dramatic events shook the Middle East.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran turned secular and pro-Western Iran into a radical Islamic Republic under the guidance of a Shi’ite cleric. The government’s policy separated Iran from its weapon and doctrine suppliers in the West, severed relations with the United States and Israel, and partly isolated Iran. These moves proved very costly in Iran’s war with Iraq. The establishment of the revolutionary regime also incorporated the notion of ‘exporting the revolution’ as an important element in Iranian strategy. The revolution indeed inspired various Islamic movements, including Hizballah and Hamas, and it later established Iran in a leading position in the Middle Eastern ‘radical axis’.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan began with the Red Army’s invasion in December 1979, and ended in February 1989 with the defeat of the Soviet Union. The Soviet involvement transformed the internal conflict between the communist regime and the Islamic opposition into a war of independence against a foreign power, and according to the views of Muslims in the area, necessitated a ‘Jihad’ for the liberation of Afghanistan from a heathen regime and a foreign occupier. Numerous volunteers from all over the Muslim world joined this Jihad, and military and financial assistance was provided to the Mujahedin camps. The defeat of the Soviet Union generated a ‘victory narrative’ for the Mujahedin, who fought the regime and the Soviet occupiers and created a generation of skilled and highly motivated warriors. Al- Qa’eda and its associated movements are in many ways the outcome of this war.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 led to the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon and consequently to a fundamental change in its stand regarding the armed struggle against Israel. The war also revealed to the Syrians their military inferiority, and temporarily undermined the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. This state of affairs led to the vacuum that enabled Iran to take advantage of developments within the Shi’ite population in Lebanon, and to establish Hizballah. The war led the Syrians to adopt, for several years, the ‘strategic parity’ doctrine, during which the Syrian Army expanded significantly. Towards the mid-1980s, Syria was in the midst of a grave economic crisis, which stemmed, to a large extent, from the priority given to military investments in an attempt to close the gap with Israel’s technological superiority.

The Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 shaped the Iranian strategy for the following two decades, and had a great influence on the buildup of its forces. The trauma caused by the War was the most significant factor that led Iran to invest great resources in the development of its strategic force, with an emphasis on unconventional capabilities and ballistic missiles. Iran’s failures in the war against Iraq taught Iranian leaders the importance of military organization and professionalism. The war greatly influenced Iraq’s doctrine and force buildup as well. This was clearly manifested in the First Gulf War and the decade that followed.

Another meaningful event that took place during this period was the signing of the peace accord between Israel and Egypt on 26 March 1979. The signing of the accord removed the Egyptians from the war cycle with Israel and left Syria on its own. This feeling of solitude had a major influence on the Syrians, whose strategic concepts always relied on Arab solidarity as a foundation for their security doctrine.

On 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) attacked the nuclear reactor that was built in Baghdad (Osiraq). The attack revealed Israel’s precision attack capabilities and affirmed Israel’s readiness to use its military force in the case of a threat to its national interests. The strategic Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed between Israel and the United States in the same year, had a great impact on the formation of the conception that the United States and Israel act in order to achieve similar interests, and that the two countries use similar weapons.

These events formed the strategic environment in which O-RMA evolved. In retrospect, a more profound examination of the biographies of players such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden,[4] Imad Mughniyah,[5] Abbas Musawi, Hassan Nasrallah,[6] Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and others reveals that the period between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s formed, to a large extent, their personal biography, and the worldview of a new generation of leaders, commanders and warriors who had great influence over the conceptual development on the ‘other side of the hill’. 

The years 1979–82 thus appear, in retrospect, as the years during which a fundamental upheaval took place, an upheaval that led to the development of O-RMA. When the FM 100-5 field manual of August 1982 was published in the United States, all of these events were already underway, and Saddam Hussein had been ruling Iraq since 1979. The ALB doctrine that stood at the core of the 1982 manual was not related to any of these developments.[7] Instead, it addressed the European arena and the Soviet threat, which was identified by Starry and others in the 1970s as the major threat to the free world in the context of the Cold War.[8]

Crisis (1983–1991)

The outcome of the dramatic events that took place between the years 1979 and 1982 was well evident during the 1980s and culminated towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s, when the first RMA memorandums were circulated,[9] the initial foundations for O-RMA had already been laid. By this time, the collapse of the Soviet Union was an established fact. The main militaries in the Middle East, most of which were equipped with Soviet weapons and Soviet doctrine, were under the impression of the way in which the US military was employed during the First Gulf War. These militaries were in the midst of a painful process, as a result of which they would be forced to drastically change their strategic and operational doctrines.[10]

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of Syria’s national security strategy and ended its efforts to reach a strategic parity with Israel.[11] At the same time, the Syrians began to comprehend the technological and conceptual developments in the West. Israel’s technological superiority over Syria had already been demonstrated in 1982, when the IAF waged a massive standoff precision attack, supported by advanced electronic warfare (EW), against the Syrian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the Baqa’a valley.[12] At the end of the decade, Syrians dealt with the threat of precision-guided missiles (PGM), with the help of their Soviet advisors. And yet, it was the participation of Syrian officers in the coalition in the First Gulf War that actually enabled them to acknowledge the real dimensions of the threat.[13]

The Iraqis were also aware, generally speaking, of the nature of the threat, on the eve of the First Gulf War. Yet, their force design and their thinking patterns, which were formed throughout the years in the image of industrial warfare, did not enable them to realize the full meaning of the developments in the West. Saddam’s hope that the West’s technological superiority would not hold against his forces during the ground war was smashed to pieces within 100 hours.[14] Saddam emerged from the war believing that he was able to take on the biggest power in the world and the coalition that joined it.[15] Nevertheless, Iraq was indeed defeated in the First Gulf War. It lost a substantial part of its army, had to disarm its unconventional weapons and was placed under severe sanctions, including No-Fly zones that were established in the north and the south of Iraq.

The end of the Iran–Iraq War spelled defeat for Iran; after the war, Iran could not realize its ambitious plan to purchase conventional weapons, due to financial difficulties and American pressure on supplying countries. Even though Iran did not take an active part in the 1991 Gulf War, it stressed the lessons the Iranians had learned from the Iran–Iraq War. The superiority of Western armies over Third World armies was made perfectly clear to the Iranians.[16]

The period lasting from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the 1990s represents the strategic and military weakness of the states (mainly Syria, Iraq and Iran) in the face of what appeared to be a new and problematic world order, which included an increasing military threat. With the military weakness of these states in the background, there were already three organizations in the fore-ground, organizations that were established in the 1980s, and which would lead the war against the United States and Israel in the first decade of the twenty-first century: Hizballah,[17] Hamas[18] and Al- Qaeda[19].

Hizballah was established in Lebanon in 1982, and a series of events turned it into the most dominant organization in the struggle against Israel. Towards the end of 1983, the organization began a series of terrorist attacks, which led to the removal of foreign forces from Lebanon in the spring of 1984, and later on to the Israeli withdrawal into the Security Zone in the summer of 1985.

The Hamas movement was established in Gaza by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, shortly after the outbreak of the First Intifada (the Palestinian uprising), on 15 December 1987. In December 1992, Israel deported hundreds of Hamas activists to Lebanon. Upon the return of the deportees, who had developed good relations with Hizballah personnel as well as with members of the Iranian Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, the movement grew stronger and set up in opposition to the PLO.

Al-Qa’eda was founded in 1988. For the organization, and for an entire generation of Islamic youth, the war in Afghanistan, which ended in 1989, was a formative experience. They considered the Mujahidin’s victory over the Soviet empire a cultural and ideological victory and a sign of their ability to stand against complex military challenges. For many Muslims, the collapse of the Soviet Union so soon after its defeat in Afghanistan was a direct outcome of this war.[20]

In the West, this state of affairs, from the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s, served as a background for an optimistic period, with Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis as its symbol.[21] Ideas of globalization and peace originating in economic interests also found their way to the Middle East, but were received with much less enthusiasm. The reality in the region pointed to another direction, one that necessitated the formation of a new strategy and a different kind of warfare.

Learning, Fighting and Evolving (1991–1999)

Methods of Learning

Military historians describe the fascinating dialogue, in the 1970s and the 1980s, between American doctrines and the Soviet ones, as well as the impact of mutual learning on the conceptions in both super-powers.[22] O-RMA, the subject of this study, was not developed by such a systematic and thorough process. The American and Soviet conception had some impact on it, yet, in retrospect, it could be argued that this conception did not evolve as a result of studying the ALB doctrine, or of reading the RMA documents or the Soviet MTR concepts.

The development of O-RMA was the result of a deep crisis and of very limited possibilities. It was influenced by the reality that created the American (and the Israeli) conceptions, yet it was formed on the basis of a different, parallel, sometimes a radically different, interpretation of these conceptions. O-RMA was propagated by political leaders and military officers in the Middle East, who acted according to their cultural and historical heritage. Their point of view was also based on close observation of the military operations that had taken place in the 1990s. More than anything else, O-RMA was influenced by these political leaders and military officers’ understanding of the social and political developments during the 1990s, in which their opponents, and especially the United States and Israel, had to conduct what David Halberstam referred to as ‘war in a time of peace’.[23]

Thus, the conception of the ‘other side of the hill’ was the product of three main learning techniques:[24]