Response to the New York Times Article Concerning IDF Operations during the First Weeks of the Hamas-Israel War

The following comments aim to respond to certain recent publications, primarily the New York Times article published on December 26, 2024, which address IDF operations during the first weeks of the Hamas-Israel war. The myriad of claims on this issue entail inaccuracies or are presented without sufficient context. In the following publication, the IDF would respond to select claims that require correction and clarification.

The IDF's Immediate Response to the Hamas Invasion

The current conflict with Hamas has erupted with the urgent imperative to halt and repel the unprecedented ground, aerial, and naval invasion into Israel by thousands of militants that started on October 7th, as well as the concurrent massive rocket attack against Israeli population centers – in one of the most atrocious and deadly terrorist attacks in history. This attack cost the lives of nearly 1,200 individuals in Israel on October 7th alone, most of them civilians, and posed an unacceptable threat to Israel and its citizens. This ongoing threat required forceful and decisive action to effectively confront it, including striking thousands of Hamas military objectives and militants in a relatively short time.

The battles that unfolded against thousands of Hamas operatives, many of them handled in close quarters by small formations, severely challenged command & control capabilities and required an immediate adjustment of the relevant operational regulations. The situation was exacerbated by the imminent possibility of subsequent infiltration from the numerous breaches in the security fence, the impending need to halt the barrage of rockets, and the potential threat from the northern front. Given these circumstances, such adjustments were calculated to allow the necessary response by tactical forces on the grounds while reaffirming regulations that ensured that commanders' obligation across the chain of command to act in accordance with LOAC remained constant. Even still, certain authorities and regulations were unadjusted and were without delegation down the chain of command. 

As the situation evolved and the IDF forces managed to clear Israeli territory from Hamas's presence, operational regulations continued to get adjusted and adapted, as has been the case throughout the conflict. Specific issues concerning such regulations will be addressed hereafter. 

The Unprecedented Nature of the Conflict and the General Scale and Intensity of IDF Operations

The theme of equating the current war to previous rounds of hostilities between Hamas and Israel is misguided, as it compares utterly different things. While previous rounds were limited in their objectives and primarily intended to degrade some of Hamas' military capabilities, the objectives of the current war are much more expansive – as they include completely dismantling Hamas' military and ruling capabilities, following the Hamas' horrific terror attack of October 7th. These objectives have dictated, among other things, the scope and pace of the attacks against Hamas' military infrastructure and the launching of a large-scale ground operation by the IDF in Gaza.

For these and other reasons, the current war differs from previous hostilities, affecting IDF operations accordingly. 

It is also largely misguided to equate this war with other conflicts in the 21st century.

In no other war had a democracy faced a terror organization with such military-grade capabilities that seeks its annihilation while attacking it from a neighboring territory it controls, and that has embedded itself in such a deep and sophisticated manner within the civilian environment it operates from – treating whole neighborhoods as military compounds; using a network of tunnels that stretches for hundreds of kilometers underneath nearly the entire area it controls, historically-unprecedented in its scope and sophistication; systematically exploiting protected and sensitive sites such as hospitals, UN facilities, and schools; holding and using an arsenal of tens of thousands of rockets and mortars that cover most of that State's territory; and all while holding hostage more than 250 individuals. Hamas has spent 16 years since its violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 to build its military apparatus, culminating in these unprecedented circumstances. 

Such a theater of operations is novel and incomparable to anyother conflict in the 21st century, and the attempt to compare supposed figures without any account of the particular and unique context of this conflict is bound to result in misleading and uninformed conclusions.

This uniqueness does not change the applicability of international law to the IDF's conduct nor the IDF's commitment to the law. But when the same rules are applied to different realities, they yield different outcomes. Under the laws of armed conflict, within the context of an ongoing war, there is no limit on the number of lawful strikes that can be carried out, nor on the pace of such strikes or the total number of munitions used. Criticism against the IDF based merely on different figures or outcomes is, accordingly, superficial and misleading. 

IDF Regulations Concerning Civilian Casualties

The NYT article addresses different aspects of the multifaceted processes that govern IDF targeting operations. As the article notes, these processes were in place before and after the October 7th attack. However, the article misconstrues and misstates important aspects of IDF regulations and processes, particularly regarding targeting methods and other uses of military forceduring warfare.

First and foremost, it provides the incorrect impression that the IDF command provided a sweeping authority to endanger up to 20 civilians in each airstrike during the early phases of the war.   

Under IDF regulations, for each and every strike, every commander in the IDF is obliged to carry out a specific assessment of whether the attack is expected to be proportional – that is, that the expected loss of civilian lives and injuries to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects, would not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Based on different military factors and the changing circumstances, IDF regulations may adjust the authority level to make decisions on attacks between different command levels and mandate higher levels of approval if the civilian harm estimation exceeds different thresholds. This is standard practice in western militaries, which usually incorporate additional layers of regulations for strategic, operational, and tactical reasons that are not necessarily of a legal nature. IDF regulations never relieve any commander from carrying out an individual proportionality assessment in attack (or implementing any other obligation under international law). They do not generally authorize the acceptable number of civilians who may be endangered in strikes. The NYT article neglects to reflect this important aspect of IDF targeting processes. 

In addition, and despite the tendency to conduct result-based assessments of IDF conduct, the relevant question, from military and legal perspectives, pertains to the civilian harm estimation before the strike and not in hindsight. 

Also, contrary to the impression that the article may provide, in no case an attack that only sought to eliminate a single Hamas commander was authorized when it was expected to endanger more than 100 people.

There were indeed cases where high-ranking terrorist figures were attacked while operating with other lower-ranking militants from essential military infrastructure. Despite the possibility of multiple casualties, such attacks were executed due to the significant military advantage expected from these attacks.

Finally, when allegations are made regarding possible misconduct, including in the context of collateral damage and harm to civilians, they are subject to investigatory mechanisms that have been active throughout the war. This is also relevant to the incidents mentioned in the article. Such mechanisms allow for the improvement of flaws that were identified, as well as the taking of accountability measures whenever necessary.

The Use of Data Technologies in Targeting Processes

The IDF has already addressed in detail its use of technologies in intelligence processing. As explained before, these technologies are merely tools that help intelligence analysts cross-reference existing intelligence sources comprehensively and effectively, thereby focusing the analysts on information likely to be relevant to their ongoing research. As the IDF published, the identification of targets for attacks is always done by human analysts, who are subject to clear and defined procedures. Such technologies in no way undermine the commanders' capability to uphold their international law obligations but rather augment their ability to do so. While using such technologies, the IDF is committed to acting responsibly and within the confines of international law. In this regard, the State of Israel recently joined a prominent international declaration in that field.

The NYT article does not suggest that the IDF's targeting process is not human-centric, as previous allegations falsely claimed; quite the opposite. However, it does mention that there were instances in some "other units" where "an individual was considered a confirmed militant if he was simply listed on Lavender" (based on interviews with three officers out of over a hundred interviewees). The IDF is currently unaware of such occurrences, which would constitute a breach of IDF protocols. Since the claim in the NYT article relies on unidentified sources, this excludes the IDF from the possibility of examining the interviewees' relevance, knowledge, and credibility.

In any case, the IDF notes that the NYT article did not purport to portray this claim as a general trend and chose to carefully qualify it. Nevertheless, in the absence of further information provided to it by the NYT, the IDF cannot rule out that the interviewees were inadequately aware of the relevant facts, unaware of subsequent commander oversight that could have struck down such claimed occurrences, or were otherwise unaware of the wider context, including the entire target-identification and targeting processes, that aim to prevent the execution of an attack of a person not in accordance with regular protocol. The IDF continues to apply appropriate supervisory mechanisms to ensure regulations and operational processes are strictly adhered to.

Generally, IDF intelligence procedures are regularly reviewed and updated as needed, including as part of a war lessons-learned process. They are an integral part of the training and education of relevant IDF personnel. As mentioned, if a breach of protocol is suspected to have caused an irregular incident in this regard, such an incident would be subject to the examination and investigation processes in the IDF.

Assessing Civilian Harm

Another point of criticism recently brought up addresses an occasional reliance on the general evacuation rate of a certain neighborhood or perimeter to assess expected civilian casualties from an attack in that neighborhood. The picture being presented in this context is partial and flawed.

First, the IDF has one of the most advanced and battle-proven methods of assessing civilian casualties prior to attacks.

In assessing expected civilian harm, the IDF – as any law-abiding military – will do its best to carry out assessments while using all available information at its disposal in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. The IDF will use whatever information that is reasonably available to it and will constantly seek to improve its assessments whenever feasible to do so. While the IDF methods of assessing harm have had high accuracy rates, it is untenable to expect a fail safe assessment at any given time during dynamic, intensive, and ongoing hostilities. 

Second, the IDF employs additional precautionary measures beyond assessing collateral damage whenever feasible. These measures, such as visual surveillance and deliberate timing of the strike, also serve to mitigate civilian harm in attacks, and they are employed according to availability and operational circumstances.

Third, it is important to understand that even the most sophisticated measures employed to assess civilian harm are hardly ever perfect. This is true for concrete intelligence, as information may sometimes be partial, incorrect, or outdated, given the built-in uncertainty that is prevalent during hostilities, and it is true for other methods of assessing harm, which may have their limitations.

Assessment of the expected damage to civilians and civilian objects feeds into the proportionality assessment of the attack carried out by the commander. Under the laws of armed conflict, a proportionality assessment is based on the information reasonably available at the time the decision on the attack is made. While the IDF makes efforts to implement this obligation in the best way possible, the hostilities may impose various constraints. When the article states that "officers often lacked the time or resources" for using certain measures to assess casualties, it does indeed reflect certain phases of the conflict where such measures were unfeasible to employ – but this is not a violation of the law.

Attempting to review the reality of an intensive war, with tens of thousands of targeting missions in total, cannot be tantamount to assessing a one-off attack in 'laboratory conditions,' with the benefit of no constraints of resources or time. Unrealistic assumptions may create unrealistic expectations. 

Using Heavy Bombs or Bombs without an Integrated Guiding System

The choice of munitions, including their suitable payload, is a professional matter contingent on the nature of the strike's objective. While some targets are suitable for smaller payloads, others may require heavier munitions to achieve mission success – for example, when intending to destroy structures that are built with certain hard materials, large structures, or underground tunnels (and particularly tunnels such as those present in Gaza, which are typically built from concrete and dug deep). As part of the targeting process, and in consideration of the type of munition used, relevant precautions are taken wherever feasible to mitigate civilian harm, such as fusing that detonates the munitions underground, causing an explosion under the surface that traps the blast effect in order to minimize the effect above ground, to the extent possible. Other relevant precautions may include the placement of the point of impact, the angle of attack, and the timing of an attack in a manner that would accomplish the desired military advantage while mitigating civilian damage to the extent feasible. All these elements of targeting are inherent to IDF professional procedures, reflecting the IDF's commitment to comply with the laws of armed conflict.

As for using bombs without an integrated guiding system – In aerial military campaigns, the IDF and other militaries that possess precision-guided munitions (PGM) would often prefer to use them over unguided munitions whenever feasible for a variety of reasons including operational reasons. However, the absence of an integrated guidance system on an aerial munition does not negate its use in a precise manner.

Its use could be made precise by other capabilities, such as ordnance-release systems found on advanced aircraft, specialized training for pilots, and highly-regulated guidelines for use.

Warnings

The article neglects to mention various other precautions in attack that were taken by the IDF throughout the hostilities.

This includes providing effective advance warnings by various means where circumstances permit. The IDF has dropped leaflets over areas of expected attacks with detailed warnings and designations of safer areas, broadcasted over radio and through social media messages warning civilians to distance themselves from Hamas operations, and in numerous cases made individual phone calls to occupants of targets, warning them of impending attacks. 

It should be stressed that any additional measure such as "roof-knocking" is not legally warranted and its use may be subject to other military considerations.

Where circumstances do not permit providing effective advance warning before an attack – such as when the strike is aimed at a militant who may escape if warned in advance, or when there is insufficient time to provide a warning (for example, when an enemy attack is imminent) – there is no legal requirement to do so. Moreover, in attempting to mitigate civilian harm, the IDF has repeatedly called for and allowed civilians to temporarily evacuate areas where more intense hostilities were expected. Hamas, on its part, has sought to forcibly prevent civilians from leaving areas of hostilities in order to unconscionably exploit civilian casualties and hinder IDF operational activities.  

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Once again, the IDF refers to its previous elaborate publication, that explains the IDF's robust mechanisms for addressing allegations of operational misconduct, which are currently in the process of examining and investigating many hundreds of incidents and allegations.