Press Briefing by IDF Spokesperson RAdm. Daniel Hagari- July 11, 2024

Good evening,
Today we began the process of presenting the military inquiries regarding the events of October 7th. On that day, the IDF failed in its mission to protect the civilians of Israel. We were not prepared for the murderous Hamas terror attack involving thousands of terrorists who infiltrated the country at dozens of points simultaneously and began a killing spree, massacre, and abduction in the southern communities and IDF military outposts.

It is our responsibility and duty to examine what happened, understand where we failed, and what we need to correct. To learn the necessary lessons and immediately implement them in our defense methods and operational plans.
This responsibility and duty led us to initiate a series of operational inquiries a few months ago, during the ongoing war - while combat continues- with the aim of examining the events of October 7th and the preceding events.
As we promised, we intend to present the findings in the coming months with transparency and humility. The public deserves answers, and it is our responsibility to look the residents and bereaved families in the eye and answer the most difficult and painful questions.

Today we presented the inquiry of the battle in Kibbutz Be'eri. We presented the findings this morning to the residents of the kibbutz who were evacuated from their homes for nine months and are staying by the Dead Sea, and to the bereaved families. I know some of you are asking why we are presenting this inquiry first. It is important for me to explain – we are in the midst of a comprehensive inquiry process that deeply examines the IDF's operational and intelligence perceptions, the senior command's conduct on the night of October 7th, and the management of the battles in the southern communities. We are presenting the inquiries according to their level of completion, as quickly as possible to provide answers to the residents, the bereaved families, and the families of the hostages, who want to know what happened that day, and also to immediately adapt our operational and defensive methods. This inquiry is not the end of the process, it is the beginning.

Kibbutz Be'eri is home to one of the largest communities in the western Negev area. The kibbutz lost 101 members, 30 members were abducted, and two additional hostages who sought refuge from the Nova party were abducted from the kibbutz area. Of them, eleven are still held in Gaza.

The kibbutz was attacked by dozens of terrorists from several infiltration points, with their number reaching approximately 340 terrorists by midday on October 7th. In the fighting that lasted three days, our forces overcame the terrorists but at a very heavy price. 31 members of the security forces – members of the rapid response team, IDF soldiers, and Israel Police officers fell in the battle. The forces fought valiantly, displaying exceptional bravery and courage. There is almost no unit that participated in the battles that did not lose a soldier or commander. Alongside acts of heroism and bravery, serious mistakes and errors were made, which were examined in the inquiry and must be acknowledged. I will outline the main points this evening.

The Kibbutz Be'eri inquiry was led by Major General (res.) Mickey Edelstein. Mickey and the members of the inquiry team spent hundreds of hours with members of the Kibbutz Be'eri rapid response team, kibbutz residents, security forces, and the commanders who operated in the field. Additionally, thousands of pieces of evidence and materials regarding the battle in the kibbutz were collected.

The inquiry’s conclusions are clear – October 7th was one of the hardest days Israel has known since its establishment. The IDF failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri. It is painful and difficult for me to say this: the IDF was supposed to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri, but unfortunately, we were not there for many hours of the fighting. For hours, the residents of Be'eri protected their families with their bodies, facing the terrorists alone.

The extraordinary heroism and resourcefulness of the kibbutz residents stabilized the defensive line in the first hours of the fighting, and prevented the expansion of the terrorists’ attack to other parts of the kibbutz. Alongside the rapid response team, the community emergency team also acted heroically, which guided the forces, formed an operational situational assessment, and assisted the residents.

After examining the findings, the inquiry team presented a series of insights and conclusions.
This evening I want to briefly describe to you the main conclusions of the inquiry team. The full findings were published this evening on the IDF website and are accessible to every citizen directly and without mediation.

The conclusions indicate that in the first seven hours of the fighting, the residents of Kibbutz Be'eri fought almost alone against the enemy.
Many mistakes by IDF commanders and security forces stemmed from a lack of understanding of the event's magnitude, the absence of an operational assessment, and a deployment of forces built in relation to the scenario the forces trained for that did not match the harsh reality on the ground. The inquiry found that despite the accumulation of security forces, which at some point reached approximately 700 IDF and security personnel, the fighting in the area suffered from a lack of command and control until the late afternoon, and a lack of coordination and order occurred between the various forces and units. This resulted in several incidents where security forces gathered at the entrance to the kibbutz and did not immediately engage in combat. This lack of order characterized many combat points on October 7th and is being examined in the ongoing general inquiry, which will also be presented to the public later.

I want to address the hostage event at the home of Pessi Cohen z”l – an incident that received significant coverage in the Israeli media – an extreme hostage incident in which dozens of terrorists were holding many hostages in the heart of a combat zone, an event we have not faced before. The hostages were held by ruthless terrorists who planned to abduct them, and the terrorists who failed were debating whether to kill the hostages and commit suicide. The inquiry team determined that under the complex and harsh circumstances, the Yamam, ISA, and IDF personnel operated professionally and orderly, making professional and responsible decisions. They exhausted all negotiation efforts with the terrorists. Only after the situation deteriorated and negotiation attempts were exhausted – attempts to negotiate the rescue of the civilians – did the forces carry out tank fire, in a joint decision to try to apply pressure to the terrorists. The decision to attempt a rescue under fire was made after all negotiation attempts to rescue the hostages had been exhausted, and after a long burst of gunfire from inside the house that raised suspicions that the hostages were being executed. We conducted a thorough and joint inquiry with the Israel Police, Yamam, and the ISA, after which we presented our assessment of the circumstances of the hostages' deaths to the families. The team determined that from the information examined so far and to the best of our assessment, no civilians inside the building were hit by tank fire. The team noted that it appears that most of the hostages inside the house were murdered by the terrorists. Additionally, one incident involved hostages outside the building being hit by tank shrapnel, and it is highly likely that one of them was killed as a result. The families asked tough questions and raised additional incidents that we will need to inquire, and we will do so together with the families to clarify all circumstances.

Regarding the conduct of the senior commanders at the scene, the inquiry team found that they acted in a coordinated and professional manner under particularly harsh circumstances and did everything – everything – to save civilians, and unfortunately, the event ended with painful results.
These are just some of the conclusions. As mentioned, any civilian who wants to can read the findings themselves. It is important to emphasize that this is a developing inquiry. This means that any new information added will be examined and checked. We understand there will be further questions, and answers will need to be provided. We will be there to provide answers.

At this stage, the IDF is implementing the lessons learned from the inquiry.
The inquiry’s findings remind us of the supreme and clear duty of every IDF soldier to prioritize protecting civilians, to initiate contact, and to act as a barrier between civilians and terrorists. We must review and implement this in the best possible way throughout the IDF.
It is important to reiterate that there was bravery from commanders, soldiers, and Israel Police officers in close-quarters battles with the terrorists, sacrificing their lives to save the kibbutz residents.

We will publish all the inquiries transparently while ensuring the security of our forces and the security of information where necessary. Although this is only the first of many inquiries, it is the beginning of a long and important process of correction – to repair and rebuild trust between the IDF and the public.
At the end of the inquiry processes that will allow a complete description of the events, decisions will be made, and implications drawn in addition to the operational conclusions that will be implemented immediately.

What stands in front of us is the public’s trust, reaching the truth, and the duty to create good defense – better defense – that the civilians of Israel deserve. Even at this moment, the IDF is in the midst of a multi-front, complex war – in the north, Gaza, Judea and Samaria, on land, in the air, and at sea. The inquiries and the pursuit of truth are central values in the IDF in order to avoid past mistakes and to operate in the best way both now and in the future.